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9 SEPTEMBER 1987

ARMS CONTROL

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USSR: NETHERLANDS COMPANY JOINS SDI THROUGH 'BACK DOOR'

PM311015 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report]

[Text] 24 Jul -- The U.S. Defense Department has announced that yet another contract for joint work in the "Strategic Defense Initiative" has been signed. This time a Netherlands company is the Pentagon's partner.

The agreement envisages joint developments of electromagnetic devices for accelerating particles to hypersonic speeds. The Pentagon plans to use such devices in the SDI system.

According to a U.S. Defense Department spokesman, the document that has been signed is not intergovernmental but has been concluded between the United States and a private organization. However, he admitted that the two countries' governments view the project as being in line with their joint interests. Observers have called the agreement an entry into another country through the "back door."

The contract with the Netherlands company was concluded literally a few days after a U.S.-Japanese agreement on cooperation in "Star Wars" was signed.

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CSO: 5200/1613

USSR: THULE, FLYINGDALES MOOR RADARS VIOLATE TREATY

PM301519 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[Colonel N. Morenko article: "Another Dangerous Step"]

[Text] The U.S. Administration has taken another step in violation of the international obligations it has adopted. A big new phased-array radar designed to warn of an attack by strategic ballistic missiles has been put on alert duty in the region of Thule (Greenland). This step is a gross violation of two provisions of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems -- Article VI and Agreed Statement "F."

Let us recall that Article VI of the ABM Treaty permits the deployment of radars to warn of a strategic ballistic missile attack only along the periphery of national territory and oriented outward. And Agreed Statement "F" establishes strictly defined sites for large phased-array radars. The parties to the treaty are permitted to build them, if they are designed for early warning, also only along the periphery of national territory, and nowhere else.

The United States tries to justify its gross violation of its international treaty obligations by claiming that there has been no deployment of a new radar at Thule and that the old early-warning radars relating to the BMEWS system, which have existed in that region since the mid-sixties, have merely been modernized. And, it says, the ABM Treaty does not prohibit the modernization of such radars.

Indeed, the radars of the BMEWS system were modernized at the beginning of the eighties, and the Soviet Union did not display concern about that at the time. After modernization the radars with reflector antennas, which existed earlier and were kept by mutual consent between the USSR and the United States when drawing up the ABM Treaty, remained at the post in Thule.

But now they want to pass off the deployment of the new radar at Thule as modernization. [paragraph continues]

And yet U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger himself declared at congressional hearings: "With a view to improving the functioning and the efficiency of the BMEWS system we are replacing the obsolete radar in two places with new phased-array systems... In fiscal 1987 we will complete the construction of a new radar near Thule in Greenland." Thus, the Pentagon leader himself admitted that construction of a new radar was being carried out at Thule in an atmosphere of secrecy, not the "modernization" of the radars that existed there earlier.

As a result of the work carried out at Thule in 1984-1987 a single phased-array radar of a fundamentally new design was deployed instead of the five radars with reflector antennas sited at certain distances apart which had existed before. There is no way you can classify those actions as modernization.

In fact, the radar in the Thule region is a new station designed, according to statements by U.S. specialists themselves, to warn of a strategic ballistic missile attack. It has been deployed in Greenland, a country that is in no way U.S. territory. Colonel Knapp, commander of the U.S. military base at Thule, was forced to admit in conversation with a correspondent of the Danish newspaper LAND OG FOLK that the energy potential of the new radar exceeds the permitted limits envisioned by the ABM Treaty. This station processes and issues target indications 100 times faster than the old one. Its range of detection is 5,080 km, and its zone of detection is 240 degrees. So, we see here a blatant deviation from the ABM Treaty.

Lieutenant Colonel Miller, chief of the new radar complex, also told the Danish newspaper correspondent about the great potential of the Thule radar. According to him, the Thule station ensures highly accurate detection of missiles and space targets and is capable of tracking a large number of warheads simultaneously and issuing data to ABM facilities to hit them. He also pointed out that this radar is capable in the future of supplying target indications to the active ABM facilities being created [sozdavat] under the SDI program.

We also know that the United States has begun construction of a similar big phased-array radar in the region of Fylingdales Moor (Britain). It is being carried out at a considerable distance from the site of the stations that existed in that region earlier. However, here too the United States is trying to hide behind the signboard of "modernization" of radar.

The United States is deploying large phased-array radars on foreign territories in such a way as to ensure, contrary to the ABM Treaty (Article I), the creation [sozdaniye] of a radar base for the large-scale ABM system with space-based elements envisioned by the SDI program. It was precisely to increase confidence in the effectiveness of limitations on the creation [sozdaniye] and deployment of ABM defense that the ban was imposed on the deployment of early-warning radars outside national territory. And yet, according to its characteristics, the Pave Paws type of radar at Thule, as well as the one under construction on Fylingdales Moor, is capable of not only fulfilling warning functions but also accomplishing ABM radar tasks. Placed outside U.S. territory, such a radar makes it possible to detect targets at long range and to issue target indications to other ABM facilities on U.S. territory. Thus, these stations together with the Pave Paws radars sited on U.S. territory at the Robins, Otis, Beale, and Goodfellow bases, as well as the ABM radar at the Grand Forks base, could form the basis for deployment of ABM defense of the country's territory.

The siting of big U.S. phased-array radars with ABM potential in Greenland and Britain must be regarded as a potential violation of Article IX of the treaty, which prohibits "the stationing [razmeshchat] outside its national territory of ABM systems or their components."

The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned the United States that its activity in creating [sozdaniye] the Pave Paws type of radar, including outside U.S. territory, is illegal and contrary to the ABM Treaty. However, the United States has always ignored those warnings. It is becoming obvious that the United States observes the international obligations which it has adopted only so long as they do not hamper its militarist plans. That was how it acted regarding the SALT II Treaty at the end of 1986, and this is how it is preparing to act with the ABM Treaty.

In the USSR Foreign Ministry statement the Soviet Union insists that the United States take measures without delay to rectify its virtual violation of the ABM Treaty. It is not the destruction but the strengthening of the treaty setup that is the necessary precondition for reaching accords on the radical reduction of nuclear arms. This is well known to the U.S. Administration, and the Soviet Union has the right to hope that it will not derail this very important document.

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CSO: 5200/1613

GDR, MONGOLIA PROPOSE BAN ON ANTISATELLITE WEAPONS

LD041908 Moscow TASS in English 1734 GMT 4 Aug 87

[Text] [No dateline as received] At the session of the disarmament conference here today the delegations of the GDR and Mongolia submitted a draft "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Anti-Satellite Weapons and Ensuring the Immunity of Space Objects".

Speaking at the plenary meeting the head of the GDR delegation Harald Rose stressed that one of the main tasks facing the conference was to prevent a militarisation of outer space. In practical terms it is important to prevent the deployment of any whatsoever weapons in outer space.

The document that was submitted today can serve as a sound basis for talks, the more so that it takes into account the opinions of various states and has detailed sections dealing with verification of observance of the future treaty, he said.

The head of the Mongolian delegation Luvsandorjiyin Bayart noted with regret that some Western countries were obstructing the commencement of concrete multilateral talks on this question at the disarmament conference and trying to replace them with a purely general discussion. The Mongolian representative once again drew the attention of the other delegations to Mikhail Gorbachev's answers to the questions of the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA in which the Soviet leader set forth new bold initiatives directed at lessening the danger of war and strengthening universal security.

Gheorghe Dolgu (Romania) noted the need of new constructive approaches to problems of international security. An example of this, he said, is presented by the communique of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty member states in Berlin.

In the opinion of political observers the present session is keynoted by the constructive balanced proposals made by socialist countries. They were the coauthors of the "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the General and Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests" and of a number of other initiatives directed at stopping the arms race, preventing it from spreading to outer space and at banning and eliminating chemical weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1613

CANADIAN EDITORIAL RAISES ISSUE OF ADI RESEARCH, TESTING

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 10 Jul 87 p A8

[Editorial]

[Text]

Nuclear-powered submarines have dominated our military policy debate since Defence Minister Perrin Beatty produced his white paper last month. But Canadian defence officials are interested in a much larger project.

It has more potential both to revolutionize the co-operative defence of North America and to heighten the threat to Canadian sovereignty. It is called ADI (for Air Defence Initiative) and is the little sister of SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative, or Star Wars).

Like its better-known sibling, it's still in the research stage. Some Canadian military officials are reported to be convinced it will be tested soon alongside cruise missile tests in Northern Canada.

What ADI envisages is a network of radar and infra-red surveillance systems carried by satellites. These would be backed up by radar mounted on large aircraft, a communications network to relay surveillance information, and a sophisticated weapons system: supersonic, ultra-long-range aircraft and hypersonic guided missiles, with short-range missiles as the last line of defence.

Because of their speed, none of these aircraft or missiles would have to be based on Canadian soil. They would be able to destroy nuclear-armed aircraft or cruise missiles sneaking beneath the SDI space-based shield before they reached the continental United States. Those coming from the North would be destroyed in the Arctic, probably in Canadian air space.

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CSO: 5220/50

Derek Blackburn, the NDP defence critic, finds this scary. At a little-reported Commons committee meeting last month, he argued ADI involves a "second-strike" strategy based on "Washington's argument that you can fight and somehow win or survive a nuclear war."

He also argued it is an offensive strategy, at odds with the traditional role of NORAD as a co-operative defence alliance under which Canada contributes to deterrence against nuclear attack as the Americans' "eyes and ears in the northern half of North America."

Beatty, however, denied ADI involves an offensive strategy, and argued it would be no different than Canada's current obligation under NORAD: to protect the continent against attack from "air-breathing vehicles." Defence officials also say no decision to deploy ADI systems will be made before the 1990s.

But meanwhile, Canadian military officials are flirting with co-operative research into space-based radar, and Canadian aerospace companies are designing satellite communications systems that could tie ADI and SDI together.

So far there has been little or no public debate about whether their deployment will provoke encounters between the U.S. and Soviets over Canada's North, or will give Canada any control over the firing of ADI missiles through our airspace. It's not too early for the debate to begin.

CANADA: PAPER URGES MULRONEY TO END 'EQUIVOCATION' ON SDI

Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English 16 Jul 87 p A8

[Text]

More than a year ago the Canadian government was under pressure from Washington to support the U.S. Star Wars program. Prime Minister Mulroney's answer, finally, was yes and no. His careful equivocation is now becoming an embarrassment.

Mulroney had good grounds for being ambiguous. For one thing, the Reagan administration was seeking allied support for a Strategic Defence Initiative without anyone knowing what SDI would turn out to be.

For another thing, SDI had caused intense controversy in Canada as elsewhere. Informed opinions differed whether any such program would enhance security, or cause more insecurity.

Mulroney adopted what he evidently took to be the safest stand. His government would not itself participate in or endorse Star Wars, but Canadian firms were free to work on SDI research and development.

The yes-and-no answer left both sides in the argument grumbling. It would only be a matter of time before the inherent indecision became politically awkward.

That moment has arrived. Crown-owned Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. has confirmed it won a \$200,000 Star Wars contract from the U.S. National Laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico.

AECL officials at Chalk River profess the contract only supports particle beam research already under way. The Pentagon calls it an SDI contract. Both are likely right.

The fact that the government owns AECL is what so accentuates the ambivalence of the Mulroney non-policy. The government may not be supporting SDI, but one of its own agencies certainly is.

There are obvious commercial advantages to the Mulroney position; high-technology research is a desirable market for Canadian exporters. At the same time, the Canadian and other allied governments have great reservations about SDI.

Mulroney may have hoped to finesse that dilemma, but it cannot be avoided so easily.

Indeed, if the Reagan administration shifts as quickly as it hopes from research to deployment, the political heat over SDI will surely rise. Every advance in the U.S. program will trigger an equal and opposite public reaction. As more contracts come to Canadian firms, the contradiction at the core of the Mulroney position will be all the more exposed.

When that happens, Mulroney and his ministers will need to deploy a more strategic defence than their old double-talk.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET JOURNAL ANALYZES U.S. NUCLEAR CONCEPTS

Moscow POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 5, May 87 pp 57-65

[Article by L. Tolkunov, chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet and professor, under the "Realities of the Contemporary World" rubric: "Tear Down the Nuclear Guillotine!"]

[Text] During one of the recesses at the Potsdam Conference of allied powers, U.S. President H. Truman informed the head of the Soviet delegation that American scientists had just carried out a test explosion of the first atomic bomb. A few days passed and the ominous nuclear mushrooms rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tens of thousands of peaceful inhabitants perished in the fiery hell.

Truman's carefully thought-out demarche in Potsdam and the barbarous bombarding of the two Japanese cities were pursuing far-reaching political designs. The United States was attempting to intimidate the Soviet Union and even then was proclaiming its pretensions to world leadership supported by a nuclear monopoly. It consciously was opening the flood gates for a historically unprecedented arms race, thinking that American technology will permit it to get the upper hand in this senseless race, send the USSR to its knees and prevent progressive historical changes on earth.

Time has confirmed the blindness and danger of this class limited thinking. Humanity has been enriched from year to year by huge new scientific discoveries. Two material and spiritual possibilities opened up before it: the first is a qualitative leap in the development of productive forces for the good of humanity and the second is a qualitative leap in the means of destruction for the destruction of humanity. The reactionary forces of the United States preferred the second. Imperialism and only imperialism, states the Resolution of the 27th CPSU Congress, bears the responsibility for the wars and conflicts of our age, for the unleashing and continual instigation of the arms race and for the opening up of new directions in it.

How much cynicism permeates the asseverations of Western propagandists, who are trying to give the USSR the blame for the arms race that has enveloped the entire world! Even while at Potsdam, I.V. Stalin gave the order to accelerate

nuclear research in the USSR. This was a natural step dictated by the interests of self-preservation. But at the same time, the Soviet Union resolutely came forward in the United Nations in favor of the total prohibition and destruction of the dreadful new weapon of mass destruction.

All of our efforts in the postwar period to prevent a qualitatively new arms race were disrupted by the United States. Throughout the entire postwar period, the United States has appeared as the initiator of the nuclear arms race. It invariably took the first step in the creation of the latest means of destruction, seeking to achieve a decisive military advantage over the USSR.

Emphasis on strength has been and remains the basis of the foreign-policy course of the United States and its allies in aggressive blocs. But the continuation of the arms race on earth and especially its extension to space accelerate the already critically high pace of the stockpiling and improvement of nuclear weapons. The situation in the world can attain such a character where it will no longer depend upon the reason or will of the politicians but will be a captive of technology and military-technocratic logic. Consequently, not only nuclear war itself but also preparations for it, that is, the arms race and the striving for military superiority, objectively cannot produce a political gain for anyone.

Despite these obvious facts, however, the strength approach, the reliance on military "power," continues to be the cornerstone of the American doctrine of "national security." Such "security" is based on strength only and actually means the attempt to preserve a "dominant world geopolitical role" for the United States and to establish American hegemony in the world. For the United States, the guaranteeing of its "national security" means the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states, to suppress revolutionary and national-liberation movements, to intensify the arms race and to prepare for social revanche. Precisely this has been the essence of the strategic thinking of the United States in recent decades.

In his book, "Game Plan," Z. Bzezinskiy, former national security adviser to the President of the United States, writes that American military power must have the necessary flexibility to allow it to be used in different geopolitical, climatic and geographic conditions, including in zones of the globe far removed from the United States. So that the threat of nuclear escalation will be sufficiently convincing, it is necessary for the United States to have a nuclear arsenal that could be employed at any level--from the tactical to the strategic--for the most diverse purposes over a long time. Thus, Bzezinskiy stresses, the United States needs a unified military potential for the conducting of military operations on the land, on the seas and in space, which is an indispensable precondition for the prolonged and exhausting political rivalry for control over our planet.

This apologist of American imperialism reveals with surprising candor and cynicism the real meaning of Reagan's "Star Wars" plans: the power that dominates in space will dominate on the dry land and on the seas, he writes. Considering the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons that can be directed against ground targets, complete superiority in space can attain

incomparably more importance than the domination of the seas ever had. Not to submit to the political demands of the power having indisputable superiority in space means to bring destruction down on one's own country, not having the necessary means for a counterstrike. Rivalry in space develops for the purpose of obtaining strategic means of pressure, concludes Z. Bzezinski.

The policy of strength and dictation of terms have invariably determined the nature of American military doctrines and U.S. strategic concepts. Three strategies alternated in the postwar period (up until the beginning of the 1980's) in the United States: the strategy of "massive retaliation," the strategy of "flexible response" and the strategy of "nuclear deterrence."

The appearance of the first nuclear strategy of the United States, the strategy of "massive retaliation," dates back to those dark days of August 1945, when American fliers dropped the first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki with no military necessity. American reactionary circles had no trouble believing then that the atomic bomb is an absolute weapon that would permit the United States, the only country possessing it, to maintain "order" as it wishes throughout the world with the help of the threat of its use.

Such was the official strategy of the United States during the years 1945-1960. It was based on a nuclear monopoly, on the superiority of the United States over the USSR in delivery systems for nuclear weapons (strategic aircraft), and on the conviction that the North American continent was invulnerable. There were plans for the unleashing of a surprise nuclear war against the USSR.

At the end of the 1940's, as everyone knows, the USSR created its own nuclear weapon and put an end to the American monopoly in these weapons. The postwar successes of the Soviet Union in the restoration and development of the national economy, science and technology and its increased defensive capability by the end of the 1950's led to the establishment of a situation for the United States under which the strategy of "massive retaliation" was already unsound.

At the beginning of the 1960's, in connection with the development of ICBM's in the Soviet Union and the establishment of a dependable system of air defense, the military and political leadership of the United States was forced to acknowledge that in a war against the USSR the United States can no longer remain unpunished and that a perceptible counterstrike will be inflicted against it.

For this reason, the U.S. strategy of "massive retaliation" was replaced by the strategy of "flexible response" that was in effect approximately between the years 1961 and 1970. It was also based on policy "from a position of strength" but already originated from the precondition of the approximate equilibrium of the USSR and the United States in strategic systems for the waging of an armed fight and from the recognition of the so-called "nuclear

dead end." On the basis of this strategy, there was the striving of the American military and political leadership to eliminate the "equilibrium" between the USSR and the United States, between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism, and to return superiority to the United States, thereby ensuring the achievement of the political objective.

The new strategic permitted the "dosed" application of military force in accordance with the "scale of the developing danger." This very "dosing" foresaw the preparation and waging of any kind of war: world or local, nuclear or conventional, large or small. This meant that the previous strategy of "massive retaliation" had not been discarded, as was loudly proclaimed, but had become an organic part of the strategy of "flexible response" that had replaced it.

At the beginning of the 1970's, quantitative parity was achieved in the strategic arms of the United States and USSR. This forced the White House leadership to reexamine its previous views and to adopt a new strategy, the strategy of "realistic intimidation" ("realistic deterrence"), which was based on the guaranteeing of the qualitative superiority of the entire complex of strategic arms. For this purpose, the United States began to develop and carry out numerous programs for the further increase in the power of all types of armed forces, above all in the area of the improvement of strategic offensive forces--nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles, land and sea-based strategic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles with independently targetable warheads--and it began the development of a new type of strategic nuclear weapons--long-range air, sea and land-based cruise missiles.

At this time, because of a number of factors, changes are again being made in the military doctrine of the United States. The increased aggressiveness of the foreign policy of the administration of R. Reagan is exercising a determining influence on the formation of this doctrine. It is a matter of the so-called "new military strategy," which came to be called the strategy of "direct opposition" between the United States and the Soviet Union on a global and regional scale. This strategy foresees the United States utilizing its entire military power as a means of carrying out its world dictates.

As U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger declared, the main objective of the new strategy is the achievement of "complete and indisputable" military superiority, the restoration of the "leading role of the United States in the world," the active counteracting of the Soviet Union in the "defense of the vital interests" of the United States in different regions of the world, and the "disintegration" of the socialist community. The most dangerous feature of the strategy of "direct opposition" is in its principles on the forced physical preparation of the United States and NATO for war against the USSR and other socialist countries.

The strategy of "direct opposition" provides for the realization of broad programs for the modernization of strategic offensive forces and general armed forces, the development of new types of weapons, the marked improvement in the military preparedness of the naval forces, and their preparation for the waging of nuclear as well as conventional wars on different scales.

An analysis of the military doctrines of the NATO countries indicates that despite certain differences in the political course, the level of economic development and geographic position of each state, they have as their basis a coalition military strategy, that is, coordinated views accepted by all members of the bloc on the nature and means for the carrying out of military operations in the NATO zone and the development of the joint armed forces. Also unified is the assessment of the main probable enemy, which the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community are unequivocally considered to be.

A decisive impact on the formation of the NATO coalition strategy is exercised by the United States, whose armed forces constitute the basis of the military power of the capitalist world. In essence, the NATO strategy is the reflected light of American concepts.

At the present time, the existing coalition military strategy of NATO classifies nuclear wars as being general and limited wars, which, in turn, can also have their versions.

A general nuclear war is defined as a war between the coalitions headed by the United States (NATO) and the USSR (Warsaw Pact). This is a global armed conflict, which threatens the national existence of the sides and in which all available fighting means (nuclear and conventional) and resources can be employed. The political objective of the NATO bloc in such a war is the elimination of the socialist system in the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. NATO specialists categorize the European and Atlantic theaters as the primary regions of military actions. The strategic nuclear forces of the United States, Great Britain and France are the main means of waging a general nuclear war.

Having lost any sense of reality, the leading circles of the United States have put all of the country's resources into the achievement of this unreasonable objective. An ominous symbol of their strivings is the Pentagon's unified integrated operational map, which plots more than 40,000 targets in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries--political centers and cities, military facilities, bridges, ports, dams, industrial complexes, etc. Each American warhead has a primary and reserve targets. In the first launch alone, the American strategic systems are capable of sending more than 12,000 nuclear warheads to these targets. And their number is growing steadily.

"MX" missiles are being stationed at a feverish pace. Each of them carries 10 warheads of increased accuracy, whereby it is planned to make some of the missiles mobile and to put them on railroad flatcars that will be coursed around the country's railroad lines during the time of an "extreme situation." At the same time, they are developing a "Midgetman" ballistic missile, a missile of "increased survivability." This compact and light missile with one nuclear warhead will also be mobile. It is planned to deploy about 500 and, according to some information, even 1,000 "Midgetmen." This year, the 10th underwater missile-carrier of the "Trident" system will be launched. The latest D-5 missiles will be installed on board this system. The American press calls them the "most destructive nuclear weapon" of all the systems

deployed in the United States. Strategic aircraft are also being updated. The 132nd strategic B-52 bomber armed with cruise missiles has gone into operation. The latest B-1B strategic bombers are being introduced into the Air Force. An aircraft of the "Stealth" technology is being developed. It is an invisible aircraft capable of penetrating the enemy's air defense unnoticed.

The "Directives in the Defense Area for the Years 1984-1988" state: The United States must declare economic and technological war on the Soviet Union in peacetime, develop a weapon that the Russians cannot easily oppose with anything, impose disproportionately high military expenditures on them, and open up new areas of military rivalry...."

On the whole, the United States plans to increase its nuclear potential to more than 30,000 nuclear warheads in the years 1980 through 1990. In this connection, it is not just a matter of more advanced military warheads but of new nuclear weapons of the so-called third generation. What is contemplated is the development of weapons with selectively heightened destructive factors. With X-ray or neutron radiation and the electromagnetic pulse, for example.

To an overwhelming degree, the third generation of nuclear weapons is now linked with the Reagan administration's "Strategic Defense Initiative." SDI primarily provides for the development of an X-ray laser with nuclear pumping, which it is proposed to use for intercepting ballistic missiles as they leave the atmosphere and for the destruction of satellites and other space targets. In addition, a new generation of neutron weapons is being developed, which, in particular, can be used for the arming of improved antimissile missiles. Finally, nuclear weapons producing an intensified electromagnetic pulse are intended for the disabling of electrical circuits in the control and communications system.

In the light of these facts, it becomes understandable why the Washington administration is stubbornly refusing to stop nuclear tests. As the English newspaper NEWS DAY writes, these blasts are needed for the development of the space laser cannon activated by nuclear explosions. Precisely the X-ray laser--the heart of the President's "Star Wars" shield--transforms the energy of a thermonuclear explosion in space into a beam of light sufficiently powerful to destroy the enemy's missiles and nuclear warheads, the newspaper notes.

As we see, nuclear tests are accelerating the arms race, opening up new channels and contributing to the appearance of new and more destructive types of nuclear weapons. This is why, as the Soviet Union declares, the cessation of tests is a key problem in the material and physical limitation of the practical possibilities for the production of new models of nuclear bombs and warheads. The nuclear arms race would be impossible without tests.

In describing the "exotic" types of weapons, the Western press makes note of their possibilities in comparison with existing types: the almost instantaneous destruction of targets, inasmuch as the energy is transferred with practically the maximum possible speed in nature: with the speed of light for lasers and with a speed approaching that of light for particle beam weapons.

The development of biological weapons by the United States is producing profound concern. Scientists stress: just 1 gram of pure botulism appropriately disseminated is enough to kill several million people. The very real prospect arises that new forms of biological warfare can destroy life on earth as we know it. In the last 4 years, as the press reports, the U.S. administration has more than quadrupled annual appropriations for the program of "expanded research in the biological warfare." The WASHINGTON POST points out that the Pentagon is doing extensive work in the study of toxic microorganisms, in particular bacteria, the pathogens of botulism and encephalitis.

At the same time, the United States is increasing its arsenal of chemical weapons. Today it already has more than 3 million projectiles, aircraft bombs and land mines, which amounts to about 150,000 tons of chemical ammunition. It is being kept in warehouses of the United States and its NATO allies. Scientists estimate that this is enough to destroy all life on the planet many times over. Let us also point out a new form of chemical arms--binary weapons, for which there are plans to place them primarily in the territories of a number of West European states.

As we see, the doctrine of "nuclear intimidation" is blocking all paths to disarmament, for it dictates the necessity of increasing and improving "deterrent systems." Such a strategy cannot be justified without creating the image of an enemy. This is why the Soviet Union is declared the "focus of evil" and why all means are being used to kindle a stupid and irrational hatred toward our country. They are employing a supposed Soviet military superiority to frighten the public in the West.

The speech of C. Weinberger at the American Space Research Foundation [fond kosmicheskikh issledovaniy] in Colorado Springs can serve as an example. The secretary's main goal was to instill in the listeners a fear of Soviet arms and in this way to justify the gigantic militaristic programs of the United States. Five generations of Soviet missiles with an increasing military capability have been deployed in positions to strengthen Moscow's global ambitions, Weinberger asserts. These forces created over the course of more than 30 years are characterized as having such powerful warheads and such a heightened accuracy for the destruction of targets that they are doubtless designed as first-strike weapons. In addition, the American secretary adds, the profound ideological and political enmity between the United States and the Soviet Union has supposedly forced the West to arm itself with threatening counterstrike weapons.

As we see, the secretary is acting under the rule: if the facts do not suit the Pentagon, then too bad for the facts. To justify Washington's space ambitions, Weinberger does not hesitate to distort the facts crudely. In some areas, he asserts, the USSR has made great strides and is far beyond research

work. It already has land-based lasers capable of interfering with our satellites, an experimental model of a space-based anti-satellite laser that may be ready by the end of the 1980's, and land-based lasers intended for defense against ballistic missiles will be tested in the next 3 years. The USSR may also begin to test components for the large-scale deployment of a laser system for ABM defense at the beginning of the 1990's.

Then comes the unfounded assertion that the Soviet Union is carrying out a program in the area of particle beam weapons, microwave weapons, etc. In the light of such a "threat", how can one get along without the implementation of SDI? The only task of SDI, Weinberger asserts, is to increase stability in the world and to strengthen peace through deterrence. But here he refutes himself, acknowledging that the SDI program "supplements and activates other of our efforts, including the rejuvenation of our strategic and conventional forces." Weinberger fails to mention that the USSR is coming out resolutely in favor of the strict observance of the ABM Treaty, which prohibits such work. Everything is being mobilized to justify SDI, the objective of which is to achieve military superiority.

To justify the American strategy of "direct opposition," some people in the West are trying to lull the public to sleep, asserting that nuclear weapons have become a means of deterring a potential enemy and of preventing war. In this way, the equilibrium of fear supposedly blocks the possibility of a "large war" and establishes a sufficiently reliable foundation for peaceful relations between states. But if one takes a close look at what they are doing in the White House, then it becomes obvious that precisely Washington is harboring hopes of getting out of the stalemate and of undermining military strategic parity.

The primary hopes are thereby being placed on the "Star Wars" program.

Setting out in pursuit of the specter of superiority in space, the United States is simultaneously modernizing its nuclear missile potential. The sole meaning of all of this is to put the United States in a more favorable position in which it, having covered itself with a space shield, could brandish the nuclear sword with impunity. Is it necessary to say how illusory and dangerous these intentions are? Today there can be no unilateral security or any security guaranteed by some technical military achievement (SDI, for example).

Nevertheless, the United States asserts that the doctrine of "deterrence" or "intimidation" has already been guaranteeing peace on earth for several decades. Is that right? In essence, these doctrines are utilized to substantiate and justify the arms race and the unceasing build-up and improvement of nuclear arsenals. But in our century security is no longer a derivative of the number of bayonets, tanks or missiles.

Finally, it is necessary for all to understand that continued parity in the ability to destroy one another several times over is senseless and absurd. Nuclear weapons are not and cannot be a guarantee of peace. Unfortunately, there are many people who sincerely believe that nuclear weapons are a necessary evil for preventing an even greater evil--war. Precisely this

thesis is the basis of the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence." But it is unsound because, in the first place, with the existence of a tremendous quantity of nuclear weapons scattered throughout the world, they can be utilized accidentally through technical breakdowns, human weakness or malevolence. In the second place, this doctrine essentially personifies a policy of threats periodically reinforced, "to make it convincing," by the use of military force in some region or another. Thus, it does not reduce but increases the possibility of military conflicts.

Needless to say, the Soviet Union cannot stand idle in the face of the threat to its security and will be forced to take adequate measures, even though this is not our choice. The result is that overall stability in the world suffers. This is why the Soviet Union is continuing to increase its constructive efforts aimed at stopping the dash to the nuclear abyss.

The USSR is proceeding from the fact that the "nuclear stalemate" shows the unsoundness of the further development of military technology, especially since, as specialists stress, the law of "diminishing returns" operates in the strategic balance. That is, increasing resources put into arms produce a diminishing effect from the point of view of the balance of forces. It remains practically unchanged and there is merely an increase in the arsenals for the multiple destruction of everything living.

In addressing the participants in the Moscow forum "For a Nuclear-Free World and for the Survival of Humanity," M.S. Gorbachev stressed: "We have rejected the right of the leadership of any country whatsoever, whether it be the USSR, United States or any other, to give humanity a death sentence. We are not judges and billions of people are not criminals who must be punished. It is therefore necessary to tear down the nuclear guillotine. Nuclear powers must step across their nuclear shadow into a nuclear-free world."

The time has come to be realistic and not to establish policy on the basis of illusions and fallacies. The situation in the world urgently demands a new understanding of the current level of development of civilization and international relations. The UN general secretary presented a report on questions of the "strategy of deterrence" for the review of the 41st Session of the General Assembly. It was prepared by a group of governmental experts from eight countries. The conclusions of the experts are quite noteworthy. They note that the extreme increase in the military potential of one state or another and the striving to achieve clear superiority of one state over another are a destabilizing factor that invariably stimulates the arms race. The danger of the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence," the report goes on to state, is in the fact that being the first to use nuclear weapons is set forth as the official policy of a group of states. This means that the unleashing of a nuclear war may not be the result of an unpredictable decision but a premeditated and conscious act by those who chose it as a "legitimate means of self-defense."

The element of self-destruction concealed in the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence," the report stresses, gives serious bases for doubts that it helps

to strengthen the security of the nations adhering to it. In any case, states the report, it is based on subjective and unpredictable elements that, together with the danger of a global catastrophe, give rise to an atmosphere of fear. The real problem is that nuclear deterrence in the world is used to justify the continuous increase in military potential and the emphasis on the defense of national interests through military means. It is based on the striving to maintain the peace through actions that heighten the threat of nuclear war.

Thus, the concept of "deterrence," having degenerated into the strategy of "direct opposition," essentially was created and developed by the United States and its allies during all of the postwar years as the main Western concept of security in the nuclear age. The problem of guaranteeing security does not lie in this, however. It is not "deterrence" that guarantees the peace. The USSR is calling for the implementation and conclusion in the next 15 years of a process for the complete liberation of the earth from nuclear weapons with the simultaneous prohibition of space strike arms and, as proposed by the 27th CPSU Congress, for the establishment of a comprehensive system of international security. A potential aggressor must understand that the time has come to choose not victory or defeat but existence or the destruction of human civilization.

As was stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress, the nature of contemporary weapons does not leave a single state the hope of protecting itself through technical military means and the establishment of a defense, even the most powerful. The provision of security appears as a political task and can be resolved only through political means. Security cannot endlessly be based on the fear of retaliation, that is, on the doctrines of "deterrence" and "intimidation." These doctrines stimulate the arms race, which sooner or later could get out of control. Security can be mutual only. The highest wisdom is not in being concerned exclusively with oneself, especially to the detriment of another country. It is necessary for all to consider themselves equally secure, for the fears and worries of the nuclear age give rise to unpredictability in politics.

Today it is obvious to everyone how close humanity has come to that limit beyond which there will be no return. The imagination is powerless to envision the hell and negation of the very idea of man if even the smallest part of the current nuclear potential is put into effect. The combined actions of the shock wave, light radiation, primary penetrating radiation and remaining radiation make the human being helpless against nuclear strikes. Scientists have calculated that if a 1-megaton nuclear device is exploded over a city with a population of 1 million, then more than 300,000 people will die by the end of the first day and about 400,000 will be in acute need of medical aid. Meanwhile, the power of the nuclear potential established worldwide has already reached 15,000 megatons!

With the accumulation of nuclear arms and their improvement, the human race was deprived of immortality for the first time in its long history. This is why the question is: either political thinking will conform to the demands of the time or civilization and life itself on earth may disappear. In short, a new thinking is necessary. It is necessary to overcome the way of thinking,

stereotypes and dogmas inherited from a past that is irrevocably gone. In today's complex and contradictory world, new approaches and new methods are necessary for resolving international problems.

The Soviet Union is demonstrating precisely such approaches. At the 27th Congress, our party set forth its vision of the world and its own philosophical concept of its present and future. But we do not limit ourselves to proclaiming our theoretical doctrine. On its basis, we worked out a specific political platform for a comprehensive system of international security. This system relies on a principle under which one cannot establish his own security at the expense of the security of others. It organically unites its main spheres: military, political, economic and humanitarian.

Events are confirming the force and vitality of the Soviet concept of peace and security. For the first time in history, at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik, the unique possibility arose of taking a qualitative step forward toward the real destruction of nuclear weapons on earth. The USSR presented a package of interrelated proposals carefully balanced with a consideration of the interests of the sides. Our main proposals include: a reduction of strategic arms by 50 percent, the elimination of all medium-range missiles in Europe, the observance of the ABM Treaty, and the prohibition of nuclear tests. There is hardly any need to say that the acceptance of the Soviet package could mean a turning point in world history.

Unfortunately, it was impossible to reach an agreement because of Washington's stubborn unwillingness to renounce its "Star Wars" plans.

But Reykjavik was not a failure but a breakthrough. These were not routine negotiations but a moment of truth that opened up the greatest prospects for taking the road to a nuclear-free world. The possibility of taking this road has not yet been lost. We are not inclined to give up.

The USSR is continuing its persistent efforts to break the ice to clear the way to disarmament. The declaration of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev received tremendous international support. In it, our country proposed separating the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the block of questions and reaching a separate agreement on it, whereby this should be done without delay. We are prepared to free Europe of this class of weapons and, at the same time, to reduce Soviet medium-range missiles in the Asian part of our territory to 100 warheads under the condition that the United States leave the same number of warheads of medium-range missiles in its own national territory. At the same time, we are prepared to begin the discussion of the question of the reduction and subsequent elimination of missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometers stationed on the European continent without linking the resolution of the problem of medium-range missiles with this question.

"It is not enough to have wisdom, one must be able to use it," said Cicero. Humanity has suffered a lot of grief and lived through many tragedies. The wisdom that it has did not come easily. It is now necessary to use it skillfully and to establish a system of relations on earth that will be defined by a philosophy of mutual respect, understanding, trust and honest cooperation, having forever filed away the dangerous concepts of "nuclear deterrence" and "direct opposition."

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CSO: 5200/1534

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR SUBMITS START, ABM DRAFTS, STRESSES LINK BETWEEN THEM

Delegation Submits START Draft

AU310942 Paris AFP in English 0939 GMT 31 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva, July 31 (AFP) -- The Soviet Union submitted a draft strategic arms reduction treaty at the disarmament talks with the United States here Thursday, the deputy head of the Soviet delegation, Alexey Obukhov, said.

However, Mr. Obukhov said that a strengthening of the current anti-ballistic missiles treaty and the prevention of an arms race in space were a precondition for reaching stability and "creating conditions for reducing strategic weapons by 50 per cent."

His statement was taken as an indication that Moscow was continuing to insist on a link between strategic arms and space weapons, which is disputed by Washington.

Proposal to 'Strengthen' ABM Treaty

PM301351 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Soviet Draft Agreement"]

[Text] Geneva, 29 Jul -- At today's plenary session of the delegations at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons, the USSR delegation submitted for consideration a draft "Agreement Between the USSR and the United States on Certain Measures To Strengthen the ABM Treaty Regime and Prevent an Arms Race in Space," as well as the drafts of an associated protocol and common understandings.

The Soviet draft documents submitted today envisage a clear-cut system of commitments aimed at reaching this goal.

The Soviet side proceeds from the immutability of the ABM Treaty and proposes that agreement be reached on mutual nonwithdrawal from it for a period of 10 years, with strict observance of all the treaty's provisions.

Another important provision of the Soviet draft is the mutual commitment to confine work in the area of space-based ABM systems to research in laboratories on earth. All ABM activity in space must be banned.

For the purpose of concretizing the sides' commitments, the Soviet proposals envisage reaching an agreement on a list of devices which cannot be put into space or located there.

The Soviet draft agreement also envisages that when it comes into effect active talks will be immediately continued on antisatellite systems and "space-earth" armaments.

The Soviet draft deals clearly with the question of the unbreakable, intrinsic link between strategic offensive arms reductions and limitations on ABM systems. It says, in part, that if either side decides to embark on the practical development [sozdaniye] of an ABM system going beyond the framework of the limitations set by the ABM Treaty, the other side will be released from compliance with the commitments envisaged by any treaty that might be elaborated between the USSR and the United States on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

Something that is of great importance is the commitment envisaged by the Soviet draft to start at least 2-3 years before the agreement expires talks on the entire ABM problem in light of the new situation created as a result of radical reductions in Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms.

The Soviet proposals also attach the greatest importance to problems of verification, right through to inspections.

U.S. Response Criticized

LD301905 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Aleksandr Zholkver commentary]

[Text] [Announcer] As we have already reported, the USSR delegation has made new proposals at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear and space armaments. Here is a latest news commentary by our political observer, Aleksandr Zholkver.

[Zholkver] What is involved is an important new initiative to avert an arms race in space. To that end, our country proposes to the United States an agreement on mutual nonwithdrawal for 10 years from the ABM Treaty. Let me remind you that this Soviet-U.S. treaty, signed in 1972, is admittedly open-ended, but it does provide for the possibility of withdrawal on condition of appropriate preliminary notification. However, since the treaty is the principal barrier against taking weapons into space, the USSR proposes that the immutability of this most important agreement be confirmed.

As you know, of course, the current U.S. Administration is actively working on the development of space weapons with President Reagan's notorious Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. It must be pointed out that many scientists in the United States itself regard SDI as not only a dangerous venture, but an unrealistic one. To put an end to all false interpretations of every kind, the Soviet draft agreement proposes that work in the area of space-based ABM defense be restricted to nothing more than laboratory research on earth. All activity in the area of ABM in space should be subject to a ban.

It is not difficult to realize that this would ensure that an arms race in space is averted. At the same time, even more favorable conditions would arise for the peaceful conquest of space. It should be noted that the just-ended joint flight of Soviet cosmonauts with a Syrian cosmonaut was a graphic example of the effectiveness of international cooperation in this undertaking, so important for all mankind.

The surprise, to put it mildly, evoked by the position adopted toward the new USSR initiative in Washington is all the greater because of this. The Voice of America hastened to declare that the Soviet draft AMB agreement had been greeted without enthusiasm by the Reagan administration, and the State Department's reaction was disappointing. Well, evidently those who are afraid that effective measures to avert an arms race in space could hinder the profitable business of the military-space concerns are disappointed. Let us hope, however, that these mercenary interests will not prevail over the interests of all mankind.

Obukhov Comments on START Draft

LD311725 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1538 GMT 31 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva, 31 (TASS) -- Within the framework of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons, the Soviet side today submitted for examination a draft "treaty between the USSR and the United States on a reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons," and also a draft of additional definitions and general interpretations for it.

Speaking at a news conference later, A.A. Obukhov, deputy leader of the USSR delegation and ambassador at large, said:

The Soviet draft that has been submitted is based on the principle of 50-percent reductions in the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States, agreed between the sides. It is projected that during a 5-year period the USSR and the United States will reduce their strategic offensive weapons stage by stage in such a way that the overall number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers will be brought down to 1,600 units for each side. The nuclear warheads on the remaining strategic delivery vehicles will be limited to a total of 6,000 units possessed by the sides.

At the same time, the Soviet side undertakes to reduce its heavy ICBMS by exactly half. This step of ours takes into account the concern expressed by the United States during negotiations and is dictated by the interests in reaching an accord.

The aims of achieving a mutually acceptable accord are also served by the provision in the Soviet draft in accordance with which, within the framework of the limitations being established, the sides will determine the structure of their strategic offensive weapons remaining after the reductions as they see fit. The freedom to determine the structure of their strategic offensive weapons will, of course, be identical for both sides.

In addition to the total bounds, a strict limit will also be placed on forms of strategic offensive weapons such as sea-based cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km. Effective limits on long-range sea-based cruise missiles are necessary in order to cut off reliably this possible channel for circumventing a future treaty and to secure its stability and effectiveness. Both sides can only have an equal interest in this.

The draft works out in detail the rules for reckoning strategic offensive weapons under the corresponding total levels. In so doing, the mutual understanding relating to calculating the weapons of heavy bombers that was reached in Reykjavik is also taken into account in the context of the obligations being established.

The provisions relating to a ban on new types of strategic offensive weapons will serve the interests of halting the race in such weapons.

Where radical cuts in nuclear weapons are concerned, the questions of verification [kontrol] assume prime importance. In this connection far-reaching measures going as far as on-site inspection are envisioned by the Soviet side.

The Soviet draft clearly follows a line reflecting the objectively existing mutual link between the problem of strategic offensive weapons, on the one hand, and the impermissibility of an arms race in space and reinforcement of the regime of the ABM Treaty, on the other. As in the draft agreement on space weapons proposed by us, the Soviet draft treaty on strategic offensive weapons states that radical cuts in the strategic offensive weapons of the sides can be achieved only if there is an accord that places a barrier against spreading the arms race into space and guaranteeing effective reinforcement of the regime of the ABM Treaty.

Consistently embodying the principle of equality and identical security, the submitted Soviet draft is a good basis for starting the coordination of the clauses of a full-scale joint draft treaty on strategic offensive weapons. We advocate that this work begin without delay.

The new initiatives recently undertaken by the Soviet side on all three orientations of the negotiations in Geneva in the sphere of medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, on space weapons, and now on strategic offensive weapons, take the work of the delegations to new and qualitatively greater heights. The opportunity arises of taking major specific steps on the road of real disarmament, preventing the arms race in space, and ending it on earth.

Thus the Soviet side is demonstrating in fact its adherence to the noble aim expressed in the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee -- to free mankind by the end of this century from the threat of nuclear destruction.

The USSR delegation is counting on a businesslike and positive reaction from the U.S. side to the new Soviet proposals at the negotiations.

TASS on U.S. Reaction

LD312203 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2120 GMT 31 Jul 87

[Text] Washington, Jul 31 (TASS) -- On Friday the U.S. State Department made a statement concerning the draft "Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons" and the draft of additional statements and common understandings to it that the Soviet Union submitted at the Geneva talks. Expressing in general terms hope for the possibility of reaching a bilateral accord in this field, the State Department stressed at the same time that any limitations on the "Star Wars" program would be unacceptable to the United States. This position by the State Department shows that the administration is unwilling to strengthen the ABM Treaty and to provide the possibility of reducing strategic offensive arms.

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CSO: 5200/1611

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET SPOKESMAN LINKS ABM, START TREATIES, FRG PERSHING

LD301615 Moscow TASS in English 1610 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS -- Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, commented at a briefing here today on the draft agreement, submitted by the Soviet delegation in Geneva on July 29, on certain measures to strengthen the ABM Treaty and to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Our position is, he said, that the preservation of the ABM Treaty is the necessary prerequisite for the conclusion of an agreement on a 50-per cent reduction of strategic offensive arms and for continuing the process of strategic arms limitation. The aim of the agreement, as the Soviet Union sees it, is to reaffirm this termless treaty and strengthen its regime by the adoption by the sides of commitments not to withdraw from it within a certain period of time, 10 years as a minimum.

This would ensure an opportunity for a radical reduction of strategic offensive arms and would help keep strategic stability.

Another aim of this draft agreement is to draw, together with the American side, a distinct line between activities permitted and banned by the ABM Treaty in the sphere of anti-missile defense.

The Soviet Union, Gerasimov went on, also put forward at the Geneva talks a proposal for complete elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles and theatre missiles on the global scale. One gets the impression that the American side is making the question of American warheads for the West German Pershing-1A missiles the stumbling-block here. Washington is taking these warheads beyond the framework of the future agreement.

We have to repeat that such a position by the USA contradicts common sense and the existing military and political realities. If the USSR and the USA hold talks on the elimination of all their medium-range and theatre missiles, irrespective of where they are deployed globally, on the basis of the zero option, this zero must be equal for both sides.

The spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry called attention to the fact that there are many contradictions in the American arguments, apart from the main absurdity, when American warheads turn out to be not American, so to say, which, incidentally, violates the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Gerasimov specifically mentioned such an example of contradiction in the U.S. position. On the one hand, the American, West German and other press writes a great deal about the possibility of disappearance of Pershing 1-A missiles as a result of natural aging. They write that these missiles will become outdated in five years' time, and five years are a possible time limit for the elimination of medium-range and theatre missiles under the proposed Soviet-American agreement. So they say there will be rally a global zero in five years' time. But at the same time a White House spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, said that the United States reserves the right to modernize West German missiles. If they are modernized this means that they will not grow old.

The aim of the future Soviet-American agreement is complete elimination of missiles of the above-mentioned two classes and nuclear warheads intended for them. Therefore American nuclear warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles must also be destroyed during the eliminations of these armaments.

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CSO: 5200/1611

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR, SPACE ARMS TALKS

XINHUA ANALYZES STATUS OF U.S.-USSR ARMS TALKS

OW020833 Beijing XINHUA in English 0819 GMT 2 Aug 87

["News Analysis: What Is the Real Focus of Superpower Disarmament Talks? by Xiang Kuiguan" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Geneva, August 1 (XINHUA) -- The superpower disarmament talks have drew public concern again in recent days when negotiations and news conferences were held in quick succession by both sides. During the past week, the Soviet Union presented three draft treaties, which include a "global double zero option" on medium and short-range nuclear missiles, a draft agreement on strengthening anti-ballistic missile systems and prevention of an arms race in space and a draft treaty calling for 50 percent reductions in long-range strategic nuclear forces.

However, the draft treaties on strategic and space weapons, which were publicly rated as "nothing new," were immediately turned down by the United States. This U.S. rejection of the treaties as nothing new reflects deep differences between the two sides on the issue.

Deputy chief Soviet negotiator Aleksey Obukhov told a news conference Friday that an accord on banning the arms race in space is a "necessary prerequisite" for a 50 percent cut in long-range strategic nuclear missiles. Because, he said, there are inseparable relations between treaties on cutting strategic missiles, and on blocking the arms race in outer space and on limiting anti-missile systems.

Washington said the link was "unreasonable" with an aim to restrict the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), publicly known as "Star Wars." The Soviet Union, although allowing the United States to research "in institutes, at testing spots of anti-missiles and factories," asked for a total ban on all research activities on anti-missile systems in space.

Washington, insisting that its SDI research was in accord with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, demanded no limitation for the research, and said the U.S. plans to deploy space weapons ahead of schedule. Obukhov pledged the Soviet Union will "not lag behind" if the United States continues to develop space weapons.

Although both Washington and Moscow have agreed to cut ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union said the reductions in land-based and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and in long-range bombers to a level of 1,600 on each side, with nuclear warheads limited to 6,000 each should be carried out within five years. Washington said five years, which was determined at the U.S.-Soviet Iceland summit, should be extended to seven years. Moscow criticized Washington's stand as "retrogression." On the 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons, the Soviet side insists that both sides should be allowed to freely decide the structure of their strategic nuclear weapons, i.e. how many ICBMs to be placed on submarines or heavy bombers, as well as the number of warheads carried by the missiles. However, the U.S. side advocates "sublimits" on the reduction, which means that either of the two sides should have no more than 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBMs and 1,650 heavy ICBMs. These so-called "sublimits" are designed to limit the number of warheads Moscow can put on its heavy ICBMs, which Washington calls the most dangerous in the Soviet arsenal.

The Soviet side denounced the U.S. "sublimit" proposal as an attempt to achieve unilateral military superiority by undermining the Soviet strategic weapons structure because the Soviet Union has more warheads carried by ICBMs.

In addition, the two sides also dispute verification of strategic arms reduction.

All the facts show that the issue of space weapons is the real focus of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament talks. The sharp contrast of their positions on the strategic weapons, particularly space weapons, demonstrates their confrontation and contention in the disarmament negotiations. Although they have put forward various proposals one after another, their intentions are clear: Each side wants, through negotiations, to restrict and weaken the strength of the other, while expanding and reinforcing its own.

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CSO: 5200/4017

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FOREIGN LEADERS SUPPORT NEW USSR PROPOSAL

SRV's Nguyen Van Linh

LD021103 Moscow TASS in English 0732 GMT 2 Jul 87

[Text] Hanoi August 2 TASS -- Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, told newsmen in Hanoi that the Soviet Union's fresh proposal on the elimination of medium-range and theatre missiles not only in Europe but also in Asia is a bold step, which is evidence of the USSR's determination to advance on the path towards a total elimination of nuclear weapons until the end of this century.

The leader of the Communist Party of Vietnam said that the Soviet initiative is a positive contribution to implementing the peace strategy in the Asia-Pacific region spelled out in Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok a year ago.

The USSR's proposal, which has been an event of historic significance, fully accords with the peaceable aspirations of the peoples of Asia and the Pacific, a vast and populous region, where imperialism threatens the security of peoples by building up the weapons race and creating arsenals of mass destruction weapons. The USSR's fresh step opens a prospect of a total elimination of the dangerous weapons.

The Soviet proposal put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in the interview with the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA has been met with much interest in Asia and all over the world. The Communist Party of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people highly appraise and ardently support the USSR's fresh initiative and demand that the United States give a positive answer to it, Nguyen Van Linh noted.

GDR's Honecker

PM311401 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Urgent Task"]

[Text] Berlin, 28 Jul -- The Soviet Union's new disarmament initiatives have given an important boost to the Soviet-U.S. Geneva talks on medium-range and operational missiles. This was stated in Leipzig by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State.

The world, he said, has once again witnessed the constructiveness and readiness for compromise with which the Warsaw Pact states are turning their program to strengthen peace and disarmament into practical steps.

We fully agree, the GDR leader noted, with M.S. Gorbachev's proposals and express our boundless desire to achieve a peaceful future for present and future generations. There is no more urgent task today than delivering mankind from nuclear catastrophe. We once again express our resolve to do everything necessary to ensure that a war will never again start on German soil.

Ceausescu, Papandreou

PM040933 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For Nuclear-Free Balkans"]

[Text] Bucharest, 28 Jul -- Romania and Greece favor preserving peace, ensuring detente, and immediately ending the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, a joint statement adopted on the results of talks between Romanian President N. Ceausescu and Greek Prime Minister A. Papandreou, who is in Romania on a friendly visit, emphasizes.

The conclusion of an agreement between the USSR and the United States to remove medium-range missiles from European territory, the document points out, could be a historic step in this direction. The Soviet Union's recent proposals to eliminate all medium-range nuclear missiles considerably facilitate the achievement of such an agreement. Romania and Greece urge the stepping up of efforts to reach in the very near future an agreement to remove all medium-range nuclear missiles, which would open the way for the conclusion of other necessary accords on nuclear disarmament.

The leaders of Romania and Greece advocated convening a summit conference of the Balkan countries in the very near future on questions of transforming the Balkans into a zone free from nuclear and chemical weapons.

PCI's Natta

LD291619 Moscow TASS in English 1419 GMT 29 Jul 87

[Excerpt] Rome, 29 Jul (TASS)--Alessandro Natta, general secretary of the Italian Communist Party [PCI], addressed on Tuesday a plenary meeting of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Italian Communist Party with a [word indistinct] position and initiatives of the Italian Communist Party at a new political stage". [quotation mark as received]

He stressed in the international section of the report that Soviet proposals on full elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and in the Asian part of the USSR, as well as in the USA, could help remove the last obstacles on the way to the earliest achievement of final agreement on double zero option. Alessandro Natta described as meaningless the position of NATO countries on preserving "Pershing 1A" missiles on the territory of the FRG. He stressed the importance of boosting the movement for peace and disarmament in Italy.

The party will never resign itself to the presence of American cruise missiles in Comiso and Sicily, the general secretary of the Italian Communist Party said. The Italian Government should review its position on the participation in the American Star Wars programme. Alessandro Natta noted that concrete possibilities arose recently to achieve an agreement, opening new prospects in the field of disarmament, detente and international cooperation. In this connection, he stressed the importance of taking measures to reverse the arms race, achieve balanced and verifiable agreements on cuts of all kinds of armaments, a political settlement of regional conflicts and the establishment of a new economic order.

Japanese DSP Politicians

LD300925 Moscow TASS in English 0908 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS -- Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoliy Dobrynin had a meeting at the CPSU Central Committee on Wednesday [29 July] with a delegation of the Democratic Socialism Party of Japan, led by chairman of the party's Central Executive Committee Saburo Tsukamoto.

The Japanese guests' attention was drawn to the Soviet foreign policy initiatives aimed at removing the threat of a nuclear war, safeguarding peace and security of the peoples, including the Asian-Pacific region.

The delegation of the Democratic Socialism Party of Japan welcomed the Soviet Union's policy in question of nuclear disarmament and declared for the early conclusion between the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreement on elimination of medium-range missiles both in Europe and the Asian continent.

An exchange of opinions was held on topical questions of the international situation, the need of improving Soviet-Japanese relations.

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CSO: 5200/1612

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: NEW STEP TO NUCLEAR FREE WORLD

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 24 Jul 87 pp 1-3

[Article by Col Chernyshev under the rubric 'News and Views']

[Text] The Soviet Union has taken one more step of good will by accepting a global double-zero option on medium- and shorter-range missiles. Mikhail Gorbachev declared this in an interview with the Indonesian MERDEKA.

The Soviet leaders have shown once again that they meet the wishes of other countries, taking into account their concern over these or other consequences of the process of nuclear disarmament, even if these consequences are sometimes far-fetched. After all, as the USSR has repeatedly stated, the U.S. has nuclear weapons in Japan, South Korea, on the Philippines, and besides, its carrier-based aviation is constantly flying near the eastern maritime borders of the USSR.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union has agreed to destroy those 100 medium-range missile warheads which, under the U.S.-Soviet agreement, were supposed to remain in the Asian USSR after the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. As I see it, now all obstacles to the signing of an agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons have been removed.

So why is the Soviet Union making ever new steps at the talks? Isn't it yielding to someone's pressure? Apparently, many people of the world now wonder over this question. The answer to it is very simple. The Soviet detailed programme for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 is, in effect, a strategic doctrine of Moscow and enables it to change the tactics on the way of its ultimate goal. The main thing now is to make the first step which is the most difficult one, first of all, because of the obstacles created by the U.S. side at the Geneva talks. Let's recall that the U.S. insists that the future treaty should provide for the reequipment of Europe-based Pershing-2s into shorter-range missiles. It does not want to accept the Soviet-proposed principle under which the medium-range missiles remaining on Soviet and U.S. national territories should be deployed so that their warheads do not reach each other's territory. If the U.S. deployed its medium-range missiles, say, on Alaska, that is, within reach of Soviet territory, the nuclear threat to the USSR would grow since the latter would not increase its nuclear threat to the U.S. and, moreover, would be cutting its own nuclear weapons.

One should also mention here the references made by American representatives about the "difficulties" of verifying the future agreement in case the sides preserve 100 warheads on medium-range missiles each. This assumption is clearly far-fetched, but some people are making it in order to delay, if not prevent the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. agreement.

Now the new Soviet initiative has created a situation where the opponents of agreement would find it even more difficult to justify their negative position. The world's nations have every right to demand that the U.S. side display a constructive approach at Geneva, and that its response be quick. The way to the future agreement has been cleared of all obstacles, and Washington should have its say. Now the world public will see for itself whether Washington is interested in concluding an agreement, as U.S. Administration officials so often say, or whether it will cling to its counterproductive approach at the talks.

Meanwhile, the conclusion of an agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles would bring enormous benefits to Europe, Asia, and the rest of the world.

First, the proposed agreement would remove the material foundation for those American strategists who are linking their plans of a "limited" nuclear war in Europe with the presence of U.S. medium-range missiles on the continent. Secondly, it would considerably reduce the risk of an accidental, unsanctioned nuclear war, which is now high because missiles available have a small flying time to targets. Thirdly, a first, highly important step would be made on the road of nuclear arms reductions. Two classes of nuclear weapons missiles of medium and shorter range--would be destroyed on a global scale at a time. Fourthly, both sides would test in practice a whole number of rigid verification measures, on-site inspection included. They would be able to use this experience at subsequent talks, and the question of verification would not be an obstacle to the attainment of agreements in the future. And, finally, mutual confidence of the sides would grow immeasurably as a result of the attainment of vital agreements and their implementation by the common efforts of the two sides.

These are the points which Washington and other capitals should take into account when formulating their answer to this new major Soviet initiative.

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CSO: 5200/1612

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: CONTINUING COMMENTARY ON FRG PERSHING

Kampelman NY TIMES Article Disputed

PM041527 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jul 87 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Val. Bogachev under the rubric "TASS: Commentary for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" and headlined "Rearmament Instead of Disarmament"]

[Text] Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms, maintains that the United States invariably adheres to the position elaborated in 1981, when the Soviet-U.S. talks on medium-range nuclear forces in Europe began. While not denying that new obstacles have emerged in the way of reaching agreements on medium-range missiles, the U.S. diplomat insists that they have arisen not because of changes in Washington's position, not because of a U.S. departure from the previously agreed approaches, but because of the "inexplicable Soviet decision to procrastinate."

In the article "Moscow's Answer at the Talks on Medium-Range Nuclear Forces," published in THE NEW YORK TIMES, Kampelman makes a very distinctive interpretation of the "new obstacles" to reaching an agreement and even invents problems that simply do not exist.

"During 5 years of talks, the Soviets did not once propose limiting the German Pershing missiles or their warheads," the U.S. diplomat writes. "Now that an agreement is close at hand, they suddenly advance this demand. One wonders just who is creating obstacles to an agreement at the last minute."

Unfortunately, Kampelman's statement is full of inaccuracies, innuendos, and half-truths. He is right only insofar as the Soviet Union really had not earlier proposed "limiting the German missiles." For some reason, however, Kampelman does not specify that the Soviet side is not advancing such a demand now either. Of course, the U.S. diplomat did not cite -- and could not have cited -- any Soviet proposals about "third-party" missiles.

Kampelman feigns "surprise" at the USSR's "unexpected" demand to eliminate all the U.S. nuclear warheads for operational and tactical missiles, including the FRG's missiles. However, there is nothing to be surprised about here. The point is that until the spring of this year the Soviet and U.S. missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km and the nuclear ammunition for them simply were not to be discussed under the mandate of the talks. [paragraph continues]

It was medium-range missiles that were being discussed during the 5 years that Kampelman mentions.

When the question of operational and tactical missiles (the United States prefers to call them shorter-range intermediate missiles) was raised in Geneva on the initiative of the United States and other NATO countries, the problem of eliminating all the Soviet and U.S. nuclear ammunition for them arose also. It was then that the Soviet Union raised the question of the fate of the U.S. warheads for the FRG's Pershings. Incidentally, the West German Pershing-1A's are "dual-purpose" delivery vehicles. They also can use nonnuclear warheads. Eliminating the U.S. nuclear warheads does not mean that the FRG's missiles will become "impotent."

Of course, Kampelman knows the entire history of this question. Suspicion arises that in this instance the head of the U.S. delegation in Geneva is deliberately distorting the facts to stir up trouble, depart from his own proposals on arms with a range of less than 1,000 km, and, in the final analysis, preserve the U.S. nuclear ammunition for the Pershing-1 missiles. Incidentally, these delivery vehicles are not only in the FRG but also in the United States (108 units).

Kampelman's "arguments" in support of the U.S. intention to convert the U.S. Pershing-2 missiles into Pershing-1B's, and the ground-based U.S. cruise missiles into sea-based cruise missiles are still more casuistic in nature. However, it is on just this question that the true aims of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks are revealed most unambiguously. Contrary to previous statements by President Reagan, Washington certainly does not wish to "destroy the entire class of medium-range nuclear arms." As a last resort, the present U.S. Administration is prepared only to replace certain means of mass destruction with other no less dangerous ones.

It is noteworthy that Kampelman did not explain what he had in mind when he proposed allowing both sides, by agreement, to convert medium-range nuclear arms into systems of other classes, instead of destroying them. Is he advising the Soviet Union to convert the medium-range SS-20 missiles into SS-16 strategic delivery vehicles under conditions of U.S. abandonment of the SALT II Treaty, which prohibits intercontinental missiles of this class?

Kampelman began his NEW YORK TIMES article with assurances of U.S. loyalty to its immutable principles of honest disarmament. However, all his subsequent proposals and arguments in defense of rearmament refute that thesis.

It should be pointed out that the United States still cannot provide an intelligible explanation as to how the preservation of 72 U.S. nuclear warheads tallies with the proposed "global double-zero" concept.

Reagan, Fitzwater Remarks

PM301335 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Who Is To Be Believed?"]

[Text] Washington, 29 Jul -- President Reagan stated here Tuesday that the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments in Geneva has been instructed to make a proposal envisioning a "double-zero" regarding medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. According to the President, "this will make it possible to elaborate provisions envisioning strict and effective verification [proverka] and to prohibit the transfer of existing U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range (medium-range -- TASS note) missiles and launchers to any third party."

The White House head announced that the United States is also prepared to agree to the destruction of missiles covered by a future agreement and to a ban on the conversion of these systems into weapons of a different type. Much remains to be done in Geneva, but it is encouraging that the current atmosphere favors such a proposal, the President said.

Addressing a briefing the same day, White House official spokesman Marlin Fitzwater announced, however, that the United States still categorically refuses to agree to eliminate the warheads belonging to the United States which are intended for the FRG Bundeswehr's 72 Pershing-1A missiles. These weapons, he stressed, "never have been and never will be part of the negotiations." Thus the United States is still refusing to remove the main obstacle to progress at the talks on medium-range missiles.

'Barriers' to Accord

LD301940 Moscow TASS in English 1847 GMT 30 Jul 87

["Optimism Unsupported by Realistic Steps" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow July 30 TASS -- TASS commentator on military matters Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

Marlin Fitzwater, White House official spokesman, said that the United States' position on the question of American nuclear warheads for Pershing-1A missiles belonging to the FRG, remains "firm". The United States, he said, will not hold talks on the "missiles of third countries" and this is its final say on this problem.

So in making a demand for keeping in Europe its nuclear warheads, which may at any moment be installed on the Bundeswehr's 72 theatre missiles, the United States, having agreed to the liquidation of Soviet and American theatre missiles on the global scale, has in view a complete zero only for the USSR. For itself it would like to have a "half-zero."

What is more, Washington intends to continue manufacturing Pershing-1B missiles, allegedly "for the West Germans" under the pretext of further modernisation of the FRG's missiles. It is known, however, that Pershing-1B theater missiles can be altered in a matter of hours into Pershing-2 medium-range missiles which can reach the territory of the USSR. Hence the United States, having destroyed, as it were, its Pershing-2 missiles, would be able, through the FRG, to have them in Europe again at any time desirable for it. Therein lies the obvious and perfidious opportunity for circumventing the future agreement.

As to the declarations that Soviet-American talks "do not concern third countries", American official representatives are juggling here. The things discussed in Geneva are not missiles and missile-launchers of the FRG but American nuclear warheads for these missiles. If nuclear warheads are to be classed with the weapons of "third countries" it would mean they also belong to Bonn. In this case there arises a really serious problem, one of violation by the United States and the Federal Republic of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, under Article One of this treaty the USA undertook not to transfer, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons and control over them to anyone while the FRG undertook under Article 2 of the same treaty not to accept a direct or indirect transfer of nuclear weapons to it from anyone.

If both these countries live up to this treaty the USA remains the owner of warheads for West German missiles and therefore it would be simply absurd to regard them as armaments of "third countries." Hence, the legitimacy of the demand for destroying these warheads with the complete elimination of American and Soviet medium-range missiles and their nuclear warheads.

Many fine words are being said in Washington about the positions of the sides drawing closer together, about the possibility of completing shortly the drafting of a mutually acceptable agreement on medium-range and theater missiles. But no verbal declarations, however, can replace practical actions. Washington seems reluctant to remove the barriers it has artificially raised on the way to achieving agreement. If the USA removed negative elements from its position it would be possible to fulfill the realistic opportunity created by the Soviet Union for having by the autumn of this year a fully concerted joint draft treaty on the elimination of medium-range and theatre missiles on a global scale.

SDP's Vogel Cited

LD311918 Moscow TASS in English 1508 GMT 31 Jul 87

[Text] Bonn July 31 TASS -- The move to dismantle 72 Bundeswehr Pershing-1A missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads will by no means damage West German security, Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, said in an interview published by today's issue of the newspaper "DIE WELT".

The West German Government should renounce as soon as possible the role of a break in the cause of nuclear disarmament since Pershings-1A are a serious impediment to the realization of the "double zero option" in the field of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, he said.

Bonn's stand increases suspicion that the West German Government does not wish progress in concrete disarmament.

Responding to a question on the recent statements by Max Kampelman, chief U.S. negotiator at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space armament, to the effect that the issue of the missiles should be decided exclusively by the West German Government, Vogel noted that Bonn was placed in a situation whereby it should decide itself whether he would make it easier to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament or intended to prevent it.

Moscow Talk Show

LD011911 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 31 Jul 87

["Top Priority" program, presented by Pavel Kuznetsov, with Profs Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov]

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsvo] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Top Priority. I'm Pavel Kuznetsov, your host, and together with me in the studio are our usual panel, Profs Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov.

Now that the Soviet Union has removed what appeared to be one of the major obstacles in the way to an INF accord by proposing a global double-zero, that is, the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles both in Europe and Asia, a major sticking point is the American warheads, nuclear warheads, for 72 West German Pershing 1-A missiles. Well, there have been other developments in this field of late. The United States agreed not to transfer the missiles and the launchers slated for destruction under this treaty to third countries, and also agreed not to convert or alter the existing weapons in such a way as to breach that agreement or escape its terms. Well of course some problems remain, and, in addition to those American warheads, they include problems of verification with compliance and a rather vague American position on the pace of eliminating intermediate nuclear missiles. However, according to some optimistic views, a deal could be hammered out within 2 to 3 months, although much would depend on the meeting in September in New York between Soviet Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz. Now, I would be surprised if there were no difficulties at all, but sometimes they, at times they seem so great they are insurmountable. Why? Professor Bogdanov.

[Bogdanov] Pavel, you know, my position, which is little bit more pessimistic than yours and my friend Sergey, [words indistinct] we have already removed, as you put it, major obstacles on the way on hammering the treaty as soon as possible [as heard], within 1, 2 or 3 months. I still have a feeling that there is a fight within this administration about major points of the agreement. And my feeling is that we are just dragging them with arm, by, if you like, even by force, to conclude that agreement, and that makes me pessimistic.

[Kuznetsov] I think it's force of persuasion, not...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Well, maybe, whatever, whatever you call it.

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Yeah.

[Bogdanov] But my impression is that with every removed obstacle you have another one, and that way it seems to me to be endless. Now you have a problem of American nuclear warheads. What worries me in that? I am very much in touch with all the statements and clarifications of persons from the State Department and the American press, and what worries me -- they are not talking about the American warheads, they are talking about German Pershing 1-A's which is absolute distortion of the picture. They are trying to create an impression that the Soviet side is still insisting...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] On the destruction of the missiles.

[Bogdanov] ...(?on the destruction of) missiles, which is not the case. We are not talking about the weapons system belonging to West German Government

We are talking about the American warheads belonging to the American Government; 72 pieces. We are insisting on destroying them. They have nothing to do with bringing the third party's weapons systems into talks. And what worries me Pavel, that American experts do understand that what we mean, what it's all about, but at the same time they are creating very wrong impression about our position [as heard]. What does it mean? It means that they have no (?still) desire to settle that problem. So they bring a lot of fog in all that you know.

[Kuznetsov] I have a theory which goes that those 72 West German Pershing 1-A's are not a deterrent. It would be nonsense to see those aging missiles as a major deterrent. I think that Bonn is envious of Paris and London, which have their own national nuclear deterrents, but West Germany has been forbidden to possess nuclear arms, and, what's more, West Germany has signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, and now Bonn is trying to get around its own obligations by trying to pose as a token nuclear power through this dual control or ownership of those missiles and warheads with the United States. So it tries to pose as a token power without an official license. To me it's a reflection of a rather dangerous political trend rather than a reflection of any technical problems that we're facing with, or trying to discuss with the American side. Would you agree with that?

[Plekhanov] Yes, certainly. There are extreme conservative circles in West Germany who are interested in having at least a token of being a nuclear power and, of course, they are envious of Britain and France, not to mention of the United States, and there is a certain degree of hurt national pride which they feel in that connection. But they also feel a hurt national pride when they think about the lands that Hitler once occupied and which were then taken back by those people, peoples, to whom those lands had belonged. You know, there are revanchist circles in West Germany. As far as the actual degree of technical control over the nuclear weapons is concerned, what you just said made me recall a situation in the late fifties and early sixties when the degree of American control amounted to an American officer sitting on the airfield or in a special booth, armed with a gun and watching over those nuclear armed fighter bombers standing on the runway. Now, fighter bombers with the Bundeswehr insignia on it. [sentence as heard] And it was really scary. I mean, nobody's interested in repeating that but it is a touchy issue -- the West German control, the German control of nuclear weapons is a touchy issue.

[Kuznetsov] More political rather than technical perhaps?

[Plekhanov] More political rather than technical. But in Europe, you know, it's that side of politics which touches upon a lot of raw nerves.

[Kuznetsov] Yeah. What would happen if we, that is the Soviet Union, decided, for example, to sell some of its missiles to Hungary or Poland and then puts nearby its own nuclear warheads and refused to discuss this problem, claiming that those missiles and warheads belong to a third country? I would like to imagine the reaction in Washington.

[Bogdanov] I can imagine that very easily. You would hear such ominous, you know, accusations of the Soviet Union. You would see a lot of demonstrations and what not. I'm afraid that still the American Administration is not capable to, to, for a, for a fair game if you like, if you like. Fair game. What I mean by the fair game -- they are still looking at the whole European business as something that should be shaped exactly in the American interest only, without taking care of any European interests. And they don't care about the very major fact that the Soviet Union is a part of the European Continent. And we have our special worries about that. They are very far away. So, sometimes you come across such an egoistic, you know, approach to the Soviet-American, to the Soviet-American relations, to the relations between Europe and the Soviet Union. Such a careless (?one).

At the same time, you hear a lot of things, that we should care about the American interests, about the American legitimate security concerns, sensitivities, and well, I believe that until we are in that game we are doomed to failure. Only when we can change the game, I mean to make it absolutely fair, equal, then we can expect a success.

[Kuznetsov] Using allies by the United States looks like a time-tested ploy. We've been talking about West Germany pretending it's an independent nuclear power and the United States says it's powerless, has no influence over this issue. SDI -- that is, the Strategic Defense Initiative -- is another indication how allies are being dragged into a purely American project in order to present it as an international one. How many countries have been already involved in this project because of those promises, lavish promises, of spin-offs, technological spin-offs?

[Plekhanov] I think there are five now, there's Britain, West Germany, Italy, Israel, and Japan.

[Bogdanov] Japan, yeah, Japan.

[Kuznetsov] What's the purpose? Is this only assistance to the United States in developing all those exotic weapons or perhaps something bigger behind the...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Well, I think there are two things which are bigger there. On the one hand, there is the real pressure which the Americans have applied, and being the senior partner in those allied relations they are able to get away with some pressure. But it's not just pressure. It's also a material interest which some people in those countries see in becoming part of SDI research, because they think that they can get some benefits for their own economy, technological benefits that they can get by participating in those projects. But, I mean, more realistically-minded people understand that there is really very little gain that they can get from the SDI research. Number one, because the projects are highly specialized and there will be very little spin-off for civilian industries; and, number two, because it's all happening under a shroud of secrecy, and if there is anything that is most detrimental to the spread of technology, exchange of technology, it's, ah, it's the secrecy. Because the normal spread of technology requires open channels. So, I think what's happening, it's a very sad development that those countries are being hitched to the chariot of the SDI.

[Kuznetsov] Well, let's hope that since security is indivisible and there can be no Soviet security without American security and vice versa, or British security without Soviet security and so on and so forth; so let's hope that perestroika or restructuring in the West doesn't take another couple of decades.

And our time is up, and on this note I'm signing off. I am Pavel Kuznetsov, your host. Together with me on Top Priority were Professors Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov. Good-bye till next week at the same time and on the same wavelength.

Kampelman NBC Interview Cited

LD022209 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2030 GMT 2 Aug 87

[Text] New York, [no date as received] -- The Reagan administration is still not ready to remove the remaining obstacles to an agreement to eliminate, on a global scale, U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles (INF) and operational and tactical missiles (SRINF), despite the prospects of such an agreement, which have substantially improved as a result of the USSR's series of wide-ranging and constructive proposals. As shown in an interview with Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation to the talks on nuclear and space weapons with NBC television, the United States continues to resort to all kinds of tricks and justifications in an attempt to evade a solution to the problem of the 72 U.S. nuclear warheads on the "Pershing-1A SRINF" belonging to the FRG.

Kampelman alleged that the elimination of these warheads "for the sake of concluding an agreement with the adversary" would "do damage" to NATO and to U.S. relations with its allies. He stated at the same time that the United States is "fully ready to conclude agreements between the United States and the USSR on the questions that are on our agenda. If you take this perverted logic further, it turns out that the "West German Pershings" are not on this agenda, and a decision on them ought to be made by Washington's NATO allies and not the United States. It is, incidentally, well known that the warheads for the "Pershing-1A" operational and tactical missiles are under U.S. control and can be mounted on missiles and used only with the consent of the U.S. President. The fact that they pose a direct threat to the USSR's Eastern European allies is, likewise, well known.

Karpov: 'Main Impediment'

LD031416 Moscow TASS in English 1358 GMT 3 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 3 TASS -- The issue of American warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles is now the main impediment to accords on Soviet and U.S. medium-range and shorter-range missiles at Geneva talks, Viktor Karpov, chief of the arms limitation and disarmament directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, said in an interview with a TASS diplomatic correspondent.

The kernel of the matter is not in whether to exert pressure on the Federal Republic of Germany or not, he explained, but in realizing the "double zero option" in practice, that is in scrapping all American and Soviet medium-range and shorter-range missiles together with their warheads.

There can be no "double zero option" whereby the Soviet Union will have to destroy all its shorter-range missiles along with nuclear warheads, while the United States will retain a certain number of nuclear warheads for missiles of this class.

Whether the warheads in question are for American or West German missiles does not matter. The main thing is that Washington intends to retain a quantity of its nuclear warheads under the "double zero option".

This approach to the problem lays bare the double-faced nature of the U.S. position. If the United States really wants an agreement, the issue of American warheads for Pershing-1A's must be solved unequivocally, by way of an accord to destroy also these warheads along with warheads for Soviet shorter-range missiles.

U.S. references to its allied commitments to NATO countries cannot be accepted. The Soviet Union has allied commitments as well: The security of the Warsaw treaty member nations is of paramount significance to the Soviet Union.

We cannot agree, and the Soviet Union's allies cannot agree, to a situation where the territories of the Warsaw treaty countries could be hit by American nuclear warheads with the help of West German Pershing-1A missiles, while East European countries would not have something equivalent to offset the threat, Karpov said.

Foreign Ministry Briefing 4 August

LD041342 Moscow TASS in English 1338 GMT 4 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS -- Reports have been circulating in the West that there is a possibility of resolving the problem of American nuclear warheads to 72 West German Pershing-1A missiles at the talks on nuclear and space weapons, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, told a briefing here today.

According to these reports, the essence of the decision could be as follows: The United States would eliminate in Europe nuclear warheads to the West German Pershing-1A's as well as its medium- and shorter-range missiles and their warheads, while the Soviet Union would reduce, along with the elimination of its medium- and shorter-range missiles, part of its tactical Skud-B missiles.

"We cannot view this suggestion as leading towards a mutually acceptable solution. This is an extra unmotivated linkage that would hinder, rather than facilitate, the talks," emphasized the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman.

"Medium- and shorter-range missiles, that is missiles with a range from 500 to 5,500 kilometres, are a subject of discussion at the talks on nuclear and space arms. The sides have reached a coordinated understanding to this score.

The Soviet Union, sticking to a principled stand on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, favours also the discussion of the question of tactical nuclear systems. There has long been a relevant proposal to this effect, set out in the programme advanced by the Warsaw treaty member countries in June 1986.

In accordance with this proposal, the question of tactical nuclear systems would be examined within the framework of negotiations on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- naturally, with the participation of the United States and all other countries possessing such weapons."

PRAVDA Commentary

PM051057 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 87 Second Edition p 5

["Commentator's Column" by Igor Melnikov: "To Remove the Block"]

[Text] News agencies have carried two news items from the banks of the Rhine, one after the other. The first item is about an article in the Bonn newspaper GENERAL-ANZEIGER claiming that the FRG Government plans to enter into direct talks with the USSR on Pershing-1A missiles. The second item reported that an FRG Government spokesman had denied the newspaper report.

It is not hard to guess the purpose for which the dubious trial balloon was launched from GENERAL-ANZEIGER's pages. Practically any other newspaper could have advanced such a "fairy tale," for the West's propaganda machine is working at high pitch today. A considerable number of U.S. and FRG politicians and foreign policy officials are ready to stand up for every one of the 72 Pershing-1A's from newspaper pages and television screens.

The fact remains that because of the U.S. nuclear warheads with which these missiles are equipped, certain circles in the West have created a real roadblock at the Geneva talks. Scenes of indignation at Soviet "carping" and "inconsistency" are played out according to a prepared "score." Why, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director K. Adelman angrily inquires, did the the Soviets not mention the Pershing-1A's in the mid-May?

But, if you please, what was there to "mention" and debate, when the United States itself was campaigning for the "global double-zero" and the elimination of two classes of missiles -- medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles? It is as clear as day that all U.S. warheads on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles must be eliminated along with the Soviet missiles and warheads of these classes. A reasonable objection may be made to those who disagree with this: What if the Soviet Union deployed nuclear warheads on missiles stationed in the other German state? What would the champions of the West's interests say then?

Yes, the question of the Pershing-1A's is a stumbling block in Geneva today. This block must be removed from the path of the Geneva talks, and the only way to do this is to eliminate the U.S. warheads earmarked for West German missiles. Equality and, again equality -- this is the only just solution to the problem.

Incidentally, sober voices also are being heard in the FRG itself. Pointing out that the Pershing-1A's were the last means for the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union to block the "double-zero option," H. Scheer, leader of the disarmament and arms control working group of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany's Bundestag faction, declared: "What at first seemed a harmless secondary condition has today become an obstacle to talks."

Obstacles to movement toward a more reliable, nonviolent, and nuclear-free world must be removed.

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CSO: 5200/1612

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: FORMER FRENCH MINISTERS URGE NEUTRON BOMB FOR FRG

PM050851 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[A. Lykhanov "Rejoinder": "Trial Balloon"]

[Text] In an interview with the West German DIE TAGESZEITUNG BERLIN two former French defense ministers, Charles Hernu and Pierre Messmer, have called for French neutron weapons to be sited on FRG territory "in the event that series production of them is begun" in France. Furthermore, they demanded that Bonn be given access to...the nuclear button, stating the need to ensure "joint access" by both France and the FRG to French neutron weapons.

The "cheering" prospect of becoming "neutron" hostages is obviously not to the liking of the West German public, and Bonn cannot fail to take these attitudes into consideration. But it has not sternly rebuffed the French "ideas" but has chosen to state evasively that "neutron weapons are not a topic for discussion."

In this connection some questions should be put to Bonn politicians. And here they are: Bonn, for example, is continuing to refuse to allow U.S. warheads for the Pershing-1A missiles to be removed from the country. And at this very moment plans to site French neutron weapons on FRG territory "surface." It looks as though in the FRG, which has officially renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, there are forces supported by certain circles in France that are endeavoring to give West Germany the status of a non-nuclear but "near-nuclear power."

All this shows that in both France and the FRG certain circles are still trying to hamper the difficult disarmament process. They release "trial balloons" just in case. But what if something comes of it?

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CSO: 5200/1612

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: U.S., NATO CONTINUE 'HACKNEYED' NUCLEAR ARGUMENTS

LD031759 Moscow TASS in English 1711 GMT 3 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 3 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS military news analyst:

The Soviet Union has cleared the way to reaching constructive agreements on medium-range and theatre missiles on a global scale. Yet the USA continues hampering progress at Geneva, by preserving there the obstacles artificially put up by it. In this policy Washington is actively assisted by official London, Bonn and Paris. Nevertheless, there is a realisation in all of those capitals that the Soviet initiatives have created a situation when it is very difficult to reiterate the traditional Western "no", since thus the most ardent advocates of nuclear weapons will expose their own selves in front of the whole world.

In this connection they in NATO are hastily drawing up plans for a "compensation" of the nuclear weapon which are to be scrapped as a result of a Soviet-American accord.

As the British newspaper SUNDAY TIMES just said, high-ranking representatives of the North Atlantic bloc states have examined in Brussels a report containing recommendations on an additional number of nuclear capable F-111 fighter bombers to be deployed in the British isles, and on the NATO member countries to be supplied with sea-based cruise missiles if a treaty on medium-range and theatre missiles is concluded. Earlier it was reported that plans were examined for the deployment in Britain and, possibly, in Spain, of B-52 strategic bombers carrying cruise missiles, and for placing under the NATO jurisdiction of U.S. "Los Angeles" submarines with cruise missiles.

Consequently, instead of a real cut in the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, a nuclear "rearmament" of NATO is proposed. Thus, contrary to the "apprehensions" voiced in the NATO countries allegedly in connection with the Soviet SS-20 missiles, as soon as a real opportunity appears to remove these missiles, a different thing becomes obvious: Some people in NATO are "concerned" with the preservation and even buildup of the nuclear arsenals of the bloc countries, rather than the elimination of the mythical "Soviet menace".

This happens despite the fact that the United States would, as before, have after the scrapping of ground-based Pershing-2 and cruise missiles more than 4,000 nuclear warheads in Europe designed for delivery by aircraft which are capable of striking deep into the Soviet Union's territory, tactical anuclear missiles and nuclear artillery as well as nuclear powered submarines carrying missiles, which are under the control of the NATO supreme allied commander in Europe. This was admitted by Burns, U.S. deputy undersecretary of state.

They also "forget" about the nuclear potentials of Britian and France, which are not covered by a future Soviet-American agreement. But by the late nineties, i.e. before the completion of the Soviet-American cuts, these two countries will have 2,000 nuclear warheads.

Also astonishing is the stand of the West European NATO countries from another viewpoint: a buildup instead of a cut in the nuclear weapons in Europe is fraught with serious dangers to the whole continent, since it will play into the hand of those strategists overseas, who yet hope that it would be possible to wage a nuclear war confined to the European framework and not outgrowing into a world war, i.e. a war in which it would be possible to "save" the territory of the United States while making the allies a target of retaliatory strikes.

If one looks at the situation taking shape in the world in broader terms, it is necessary to point out the main thing: Even if full agreement is reached on the issues of medium and theatre missiles, the USA, Britain, the FRG and France by no means wish to view it as a step towards nuclear free Europe and nuclear free world. The main point to them is to preserve "nuclear deterrence", and that the "flexible reaction" strategy be left intact. All this is evidence of how strong the old stereotypes leaving their imprint on foreign policy yet are. The ruling circles of some NATO member countries do not seem to wish to give up the hackneyed cliches of outdated nuclear scholastics.

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CSO: 5200/1612

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

MOSCOW TV ON SHULTZ ACCORD, 'OPTIMISM,' 'OBSTRUCTIONS'

LD042047 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Aug 87

[Political observer Valentin Zorin report from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Reports from Geneva show that the U.S. delegation at the medium-range missile talks is amassing more and more new obstacles in the road to achieving an agreement. Over to Moscow Television's political observer, Valentin Zorin:

[Zorin] Hello, comrades. When acquainting myself with the reports about which you have just heard, I voluntarily recall the conversation 2 months ago with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. The discussion took place in Venice at the residence of the U.S. delegation immediately following the end of the conference of the leaders of the seven leading capitalist countries. The secretary of state was then in an excellent mood, and, when we switched on our cameras, he declared in an interview for "Vremya" that by achieving agreement with the allies on conditions for the Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range missiles Washington had removed the last obstacle in the road to success. Shultz was still more optimistic in an off-the-record conversation that took place afterwards, declaring that an agreement can be signed in the near future.

However, as the last 2 months have shown, the optimism of the U.S. secretary of state at that time was either assumed or did not have sufficient grounds. An increasing number of new, artificially accumulated obstructions are appearing at the Geneva talks. In the hope of putting an end to these obstructions, the Soviet Union, as is known, has made yet another move -- and an extremely substantial and bold one -- facilitating a solution of the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles by declaring its readiness to eliminate these missiles fully, not only in Europe but in Asia.

However, Washington once again started seeking routine obstacles on the road to an agreement. That is how things stand today. So what about the recent optimism of George Shultz? I personally feel that at that time he was not being sly, but purely and simply he miscalculated, overrating external circumstances and underestimating -- which is, of course, considering his informedness, strange -- the fierce opposition offered to any step on the road to a real halt to the arms race by forces that are extremely influential today in the United States, from military industrialists to extreme right-wing politicians.

Their power is so great that to a large extent they can block decisions made at a very high level.

As far as one can judge, a fierce struggle now has developed behind the Washington scenes, carefully shielded from the gaze of outsiders. In particular, one can hardly consider accidental and unrelated the sudden announcement of the resignation of one of the yes-men of the military-industrial complex in the Washington administration -- Kenneth Adelman -- who has done much over the past years to sabotage constructive progress of Soviet-U.S. talks. Incidentally, apart from Adelman, opponents of accord in Washington now have people to rely on.

It will be possible to gage the prevailing attitude in Washington from what decision is finally made by the U.S. Administration with regard to the constructive Soviet proposals at the medium-range missiles talks: the demands of common sense and a responsible approach to the matter, or the selfish interests of the military corporations and their political agents.

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CSO: 5200/1612

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET DELEGATE TO COVENTRY CONVENTION FOR 'NUCLEAR-FREE EUROPE'

LD221439 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1230 GMT 22 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jul--TASS correspondents Vladimir Yegorov and Gennadiy Talalayev report:

The Soviet delegation views the Sixth Convention "For European Nuclear Disarmament," which ended in Coventry on 19 July, as a success for the forces of peace and detente. Speaking at a press conference here today, delegation head Grigoriy Lokshin, secretary of the Soviet Peace Committee, declared: "Despite the differences in their views, some 1,000 political, public, and trade union figures from 32 countries were unanimous in that the consolidation of all peace-loving forces in the world is necessary in the struggle for a nuclear-free world and the survival of mankind."

The participants in the convention, he said, welcomed the idea of concluding a USSR-U.S. agreement on the liquidation of medium-range, and operational and tactical missiles in Europe, which could become a breakthrough to the universal liquidation of nuclear arsenals. For the first time in the history of these conventions, a final document was adopted; the "Coventry Appeal" to peace movements, in which representatives of East and West confirmed their resolution to do everything possible to halt the arms race. In this connection, special importance is gained by the convention's decision to hold an all-European demonstration in Brussels on 25 October of this year under the slogan: "For a Nuclear-Free Europe, for a Nuclear-Free World."

The head of the Soviet delegation also noted that there had been attempts in Coventry by some groups that had wormed their way into the antiwar movement to divert debate away from the global problems of war and peace. G. Lokshin made particular mention of a statement that was distributed at the forum by the so-called Moscow group "for the establishment of trust between East and West." It was picked up by the "Voice of America," the BBC, and other Western radio stations. Operating under the signboard of the "defense of human rights," the group claimed that the Soviet Peace Committee allegedly refused categorically to include the group's representatives in the delegation. In reality, G. Lokshin pointed out, we met the leadership of the ".rust" group and were convinced that its program had nothing in common with the tasks of the antiwar movement, but

merely pursued narrow, selfish goals. It was this that made impossible their membership in the Soviet delegation. Incidentally, various groups were represented in the delegation, such as "Rock Musicians for Peace" and "Ecology and Peace." The doors of the Soviet Peace Committee remain open to all who sincerely share the ideals of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world and are ready for concrete cooperation, he said in conclusion.

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CSO: 5200/1612

AMSTERDAM PAPER PRAISES GORBACHEV 'CONCESSIONS'

PM301515 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 24 Jul 87 p 3

[Editorial: "Progress"]

[Text] Gorbachev must have made great efforts to ensure that a disarmament agreement can be reached this year with the United States on shorter- and medium-range missiles. With his acceptance of a global double-zero solution the Soviet leader has made yet another concession. Moscow had wanted to keep around 30 SS-20's with 100 nuclear warheads in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Washington would be allowed to deploy 100 INF missiles in the United States. NATO recently expressed its preference for a global withdrawal of INF missiles. Now Gorbachev has not only acceded to this Western demand, he is also clearly accepting the presence of U.S. nuclear arms in Asia.

These concessions by the Soviet Union amount to an important step forward. But it is doubtful whether they are enough to impart new impetus to the disarmament talks in Geneva. These negotiations have reached a serious impasse in the last few weeks, something for which Washington and Moscow have been blaming each other. The SS-20's in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, effective verification of an INF accord, the continued presence of 72 Pershing-1A missiles in the FRG, the timetable for the destruction of the missiles, and U.S. plans to convert Pershing-2 missiles into shorter-range missiles and for the deployment of cruise missiles at sea appear to be important obstacles.

Gorbachev has now removed some of these obstacles. The fact that INF missiles might now disappear completely considerably simplifies the verification of an INF accord. But other obstacles remain. The most important is undoubtedly the Pershing-1A. The 72 missiles are under the control of the West German Army, but their nuclear warheads belong to the Americans. Moscow is

demanding that these nuclear arms should now also be withdrawn, and this is not unreasonable. For why should the Soviet Union withdraw all its shorter- and medium-range nuclear missiles if the Americans are allowed to keep 72 warheads? In addition, these missiles are outmoded and thus hardly of any military importance any longer.

However, the importance of these missiles is above all political. The preservation of the Pershing-1A's was the consolation prize with which it was finally possible to persuade the West German Government to accept the double-zero option. If the FRG must now hand back this consolation prize, it is to be feared that whole of the paralyzing discussion about the link between European security and that of the United States, and about Germany as the only nuclear battlefield in Europe will flare up again in Bonn. It would be unforgivable, however, for the United States and NATO to allow Gorbachev's concessions to go unanswered.

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CSO: 5200/2582

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

UN ISSUES GORBACHEV MERDEKA REPLIES--New York, 3 Aug (TASS)--The text of replies given by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to questions from the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA has been issued in the United Nations as an official document of the General Assembly and the Security Council. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1601 GMT 3 Aug 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1612

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: PROGRESS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BAN MEASURES

PM041030 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Aug 87 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "At the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has examined and approved measures implemented by ministries and departments on the basis of the results of the second conference held in Geneva in September 1986 to examine the operation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as the meeting of scientific and technical experts held in accordance with that conference's recommendation (March-April 1987). It was noted that important accords were reached at these forums on specific confidence-building measures to increase the effectiveness of the convention and to step up international cooperation in the sphere of the peaceful use of biological science.

The USSR Council of Ministers instructed the relevant ministries and departments to take all necessary measures to ensure the unconditional, strict fulfillment of these accords, which deal with the exchange of information and data on the activity of research centers and laboratories that have a high level of biological protection and on epidemic outbreaks that deviate from the norm, and also with encouraging the publication of the results of scientific research and the widening of contacts among scientists in biology.

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CSO: 5200/1610

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

IZVESTIYA COMMENTARY ON FIRST HALF OF CD SUMMER SESSION

PM021633 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent V. Kuznetsov: "Goodwill and Delaying Tactics"]

[Text] Geneva -- The 424th session held here marks the halfway point in the current summer session of the Disarmament Conference.

The 40 participants in the conference are displaying an increasingly active interest in the agenda, which includes such major problems as ending nuclear arms tests, preventing an arms race in space, preparing a treaty to ban chemical weapons, and other issues. It is noteworthy that the heads of diplomatic departments of countries not actually involved in the Geneva disarmament forum have also come to Geneva this time to address the session. Vietnamese, Spanish, Norwegian, and other representatives have spoken, for example.

The session reflects a realization that the shortest route to beginning nuclear disarmament and entering the 21st century free of nuclear arms is to end nuclear weapon tests. The socialist countries have submitted for discussion the document "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on a Complete and General Ban on Nuclear Weapon Tests." This joint document is the logical development of the appeal by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee to aim for a total ban on nuclear tests as a priority measure in the task of ending the development, production, and improvement of nuclear arms and reducing and ultimately eliminating them. The "Basic Provisions" contain the basis for multilateral talks and develops specific proposals, including a provision on verification which must incorporate national technical means, international measures, and on-site inspection. While proposing an immediate start to work by a special committee, the socialist countries do not take an inflexible position, as V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, stressed, but are prepared to listen to any proposals on this issue.

I asked Ambassador Richard Gatler [name as published], head of the Australian delegation, how the discussion of this important problem is progressing at the session.

"We are now comprehensively studying the problem. One would like this process to move faster, but the participants have different approaches and we are being held up by the mistrust of one another's intentions. The "Basic Provisions" are an invitation to solve the problem of banning nuclear arms tests. It is very important that the Soviet Union and the East European countries are prepared to study the proposals of other

states. Favorable preconditions have now been created in the context of General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's new initiatives for beginning to seek specific results in this sphere. That is why, in my opinion, it is particularly important to solve the technical problems of verification and monitoring with the aid of local seismic verification systems. This is discussed in the "Basic Provisions" and I also mentioned it myself in my latest address. This approach is very important, as technical verification removes all objections in the monitoring sphere and makes the Treaty on a Complete and General Ban on Nuclear Weapon Tests an important instrument in increasing trust and beginning full-scale talks on complete and general disarmament."

This idea came across in the speeches by the representatives of a number of developing states and socialist community countries.

Not everyone, however, takes such a constructive attitude. When the discussion began on the proposal to set up a special committee to study the question of mutual monitoring of nuclear weapon tests, the United States and its closest allies introduced labyrinthine procedural delays, basically rejecting any real discussion of the problem.

Disparity between word and deed -- this is how one can describe the American delegation's tactics. M. Friedensdorf [name as published], head of the U.S. delegation, verbally acknowledged the importance of a multilateral discussion of disarmament problems, loudly making the point that the United States "wants fair agreements on arms control in the nuclear test sphere." The reverse is true in practice, however. Addressing a plenary session, Yu. K. Nazarkin, the head of the Soviet delegation, exposed this political hypocrisy, emphasizing that the U.S. Administration's negative attitude toward the problem of banning nuclear arms is well known. In Geneva at the USSR-U.S. talks on this issue and at the multilateral disarmament forum the United States is frankly sabotaging any real accords, preferring to keep to verbal squabbling.

The summer session of the Disarmament Conference has begun the second stage of its work; there is still a chance to display goodwill and the desire to find multilateral solutions to this complex problem, primarily in the sphere of banning nuclear weapon tests.

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CSO: 5200/1609

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ATTENDS CD

Visit Announced

AU031718 Paris AFP in English 1710 GMT 3 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva, Aug 3 (AFP) -- Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has come to Geneva Wednesday and make a speech at the U.N. disarmament talks here Thursday, U.N. officials said.

Mr. Shevardnadze will arrive in Geneva Wednesday afternoon and meet with French Ambassador Pierre Morel, who is the acting conference chairman, Thursday shortly before 0800 GMT, the sources said.

Mr. Shevardnadze's speech will coincide with the 42nd anniversary of the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima.

Soviet sources here did not rule out contacts between Mr. Shevardnadze and U.S. negotiators on intermediate-range missiles, strategic weapons and defence and space weapons.

Mr. Shevardnadze is expected to hold a press conference on Friday, sources said.

Shevardnadze To Address Conference

LD040924 Moscow World Service in English 0900 GMT 4 Aug 87

[Text] The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov has told our correspondent that the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will address the Geneva disarmament conference session on 6 August. The multilateral conference is held in the United Nations framework to accelerate mutually acceptable solutions and agreements on complete and universal disarmament.

When he was asked about the chances of a meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and the United States Secretary George Shultz in Geneva, Gennadiy Gerasimov said there were no such plans.

Makes Statement on Arrival

LD051734 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva, 5 August (TASS) -- Eduard Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR minister of foreign affairs, arrived here today and made the following statement.:

I am glad to meet Geneva, which for many people in the world symbolizes contacts and cooperation in the name of a better future for the peoples. In this regard, I remember November 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev met the U.S. President here.

Following that memorable Geneva summit, a lot has been said to the effect that the hopes it produced turned out to be unrealistic, but now, 2 years on, we again sense that the spirit of Geneva is still alive.

An agreement on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles has almost been worked out.

An historic convention on banning production of chemical arms and destroying stocks of them is almost ready.

We arrived in Geneva to assist in removing that "almost", to assist the disarmament conference in solving the tasks facing it, by means of an explanation of the Soviet position and a number of new Soviet proposals.

Of course, our plans also include a meeting with the delegations of the USSR and the United States at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons.

At one time, Geneva was compared to a whole continent. Remembering Switzerland's traditional industry, we would use a different comparison: the ticking of the clock of history can be heard especially clear here.

The aim of Soviet foreign policy is to do everything to ensure the clock does not stop and to ensure the nuclear and space age does not turn out to be the last one in the history of mankind.

We intend to talk about that and other important matters in the Palace of Nations tomorrow.

Cordial thanks for the warm reception. Peace and prosperity to the citizens of Geneva and all of Switzerland.

States CW Talks 'Possible'

LD061056 Moscow TASS in English 1047 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva August 6 TASS -- As it was stated here by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze, a complete ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles would be an event of great universal significance. Speaking at the Conference on Disarmament today, he noted that it was now possible to adopt a relevant convention and that the Soviet Union would further vigorously assist this.

The minister said that at the talks on this question the Soviet delegation would proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without right of refusal.

In addition to this, the Soviet side invited the participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of Soviet chemical weapons and observe the technology of destroying chemical weapons at a mobile facility. "We will later invite experts to the specialized plant for the destruction of chemical weapons now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk", Eduard Shevardnadze said further.

On expressing hope that this would untie the knots impeding the drafting of the convention Eduard Shevardnadze proposed to hold this year an additional session of the Conference on Disarmament so as to complete most of the drafting of the convention banning chemical weapons.

Comments on Global-Double Zero

LD060928 Moscow TASS in English 0927 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva August 6 TASS -- Addressing the participants in the Conference on Disarmament the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union "had done all in our power" to reach agreement with the United States on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles on the basis of a "global double zero". If this agreement is reached, he said, this will result in the elimination of "all nuclear warheads on two classes of arms of the two countries", including those on Pershing-1A missiles belonging to the FRG.

The minister recalled that under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty the FRG had undertaken not to acquire nuclear arms. If the Pershing-1A missiles are FRG systems, the questions arises: Why and by what right does the FRG possess nuclear arms? The USSR will never acquiesce in West Germany becoming a nuclear power, Eduard Shevardnadze said.

Lists Policy Objectives

LD060932 Moscow TASS in English 0930 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva August 6 TASS -- Addressing the participants in the Conference on Disarmament the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze named the following basic objectives which the Soviet Union is seeking to achieve:

- The conclusion of treaties with the United States and of international agreements on the complete destruction of nuclear weapons worldwide,
- A strict and universal ban on deployment of any arms in outer space,
- The establishment of an international regime under which there will be no chemical weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in the world,
- The reduction of conventional weapons to the lowest possible levels required for defence,

-- The establishment, on the basis of cooperation among all states in the world, of a comprehensive system of international security, under which the United Nations could, in accordance with its charter, effectively maintain peace and security.

The minister also outlined the USSR's consistent practical actions to attain these aims.

Discusses Verification Plans

LD060958 Moscow TASS in English 0956 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva August 6 TASS -- The Soviet approach to the problem of real verification of disarmament is a reflection of new political thinking, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze said today when addressing the Conference on Disarmament.

The Soviet Union is proposing an exceptionally wide variety of forms and methods of verification -- both national and international, he said.

On calling on the conference to facilitate the attainment of a Soviet-American accord on the banning of nuclear tests the minister proposed to create for this purpose a special group of scientific experts which would be assigned the task of working out and submitting agreed-upon recommendations on a system of verification for a possible agreement. The USSR also proposes to establish an international system of global radiation safety monitoring, involving the use of space communication links.

The USSR insists on a continuous monitoring of the process of destroying nuclear arms -- at this stage intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and that there be mandatory access to Soviet and U.S. military facilities in third countries where missiles could be stationed.

In the matter of international verification to make sure that outer space remains peaceful the USSR views as reasonable the idea of inspecting each space launch and proposes the permanent presence of groups of inspectors at all space launch sites. If a state has no intention of putting weapons in space, there can be no reason for it to object to international inspections of its space activities, Eduard Shevardnadze said.

Text of Address to Conference

PM070930 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Aug 87 Second Edition pp 4, 5

[Text] Geneva, 6 Aug -- E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, addressed the Conference on Disarmament here today. At the beginning of the session, he was welcomed by Pierre Morel (France), president of the conference this month.

In his speech, E.A. Shevardnadze said:

Esteemed Mr President!

I am pleased to extend my greetings to you and express the confidence that under your guidance the conference will be able to achieve positive results.

There are numerous agencies in the world dealing with the misfortunes of the human race, ranging from the torment of hunger to threats to the biosphere. However, those

miseries and threats cannot be eliminated unless a solution is found to the main problem of destroying the material base for waging war. That is the problem of disarmament, the problem with which you are dealing as the world's only body established for that purpose.

Documents of vital importance for the world's future were drawn up within these walls -- the treaties on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and on nonemplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and the ocean floor, the conventions on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and on the nonuse of environmental modification techniques for military purposes. Remarkable in and of themselves as major landmarks in developing international legal thinking, they have added a new dimension to our common security.

They are proof of the possibility of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world, of an era without wars or weapons, as described by Mikhail Gorbachev in his statement on 15 January 1986. In other words, they were, to some extent, a prelude to the conclusion reached by the Soviet leadership following a thorough analysis of the realities of the nuclear and space age.

We may differ as to the interpretation of particular issues but all your previous activities and the documents adopted on the basis of consensus demonstrate that states are capable of exercising voluntary self-restraint in security for the sake of common good.

We view your activities as a manifestation of new political thinking that must be built into the machinery of interstate relations in the nuclear age.

This thinking starts with a clear understanding of the realities of this age. Not only those realities, but the words themselves -- the nuclear age -- should make people shudder. However, too many people utter them calmly as if they were indifferent to the possibility that all the preceding ages -- the stone or the bronze age, the renaissance or the enlightenment -- which offered mankind new and each time increasingly more advanced methods of meeting its intellectual and material needs, would be wiped out by an age that has produced the means of mankind's self-annihilation.

Can we remain calm?

Can this be called progress?

Can this be considered fatally inevitable?

To all these questions, the only answer is no.

Great ideas do not grow old, they are just filled with new content. The call of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the great citizen of this city, for "a natural human condition -- equality and freedom" can and must be interpreted in the context of our time.

Such conditions cannot be attained while there are weapons capable of destroying all life on earth. It is regrettable that the advocates of so-called nuclear deterrence pass this fact over in silence.

The concept of deterrence is also dangerous because it dooms all states to life in constant fear, making them nuclear hostages.

If they complete the logical chain of arguments, the proponents of nuclear deterrence must admit that it pushes toward total nuclear deterrence -- a situation where every state would wish to acquire such weapon systems.

I am absolutely convinced that the conference that put into practice the idea of nuclear nonproliferation knows about that danger.

Therefore, when we say that a nuclear-free and nonviolent world is the only reasonable alternative to the doctrine of deterrence, we hope for a sympathetic response.

Although some have described such a world as fantasy, it is already emerging before our very eyes. A mere two weeks ago, prior to Mikhail Gorbachev's interview with the Indonesian newspaper "MERDEKA," a nuclear-free world was more than 20 warheads farther away from us; since Reykjavik that distance has become shorter by almost 2000 warheads.

If I am asked why I am referring to this as an accomplishment, I will say that for the Soviet Union this is indeed so: We have done all in our power, we have removed everything that could obstruct an agreement, based on a "global double-zero."

We have dropped the condition concerning the British and French nuclear forces. We consider medium-range missiles apart from the problem of strategic and space arms even though we would prefer to discuss them together. We have called for the total elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe. Finally, we have arrived at the concept of a "global double-zero" that is the total removal of two classes of nuclear weapons from Soviet and U.S. arsenals. It is no secret that the Soviet side would have to reduce a significantly greater number of missiles than the U.S. side.

So, what is holding things up now, ladies and gentlemen?

Our partners have found the snags. The main one is the Pershing-1A missiles.

We are being asked why we have raised this issue and why we have not raised it earlier.

Let me say this: The question of what the West knew about the Soviet position, and when it knew it, is utterly irrelevant in this particular case. After all, determining what arms are to be eliminated is what negotiations are all about.

What we are discussing in effect is which specific nuclear systems with ranges between 500 and 1,000 km should be subject to elimination. The agreement in principle on that score states that all such systems without exception must be eliminated, which also means Pershing-1A's.

If, however, someone has chosen to start a dispute about who those missiles belong to, we are quite prepared to discuss that point too.

We would prefer to discuss it only at the negotiating table, but we are forced into a public debate so the truth of the matter and our position should not be distorted.

To begin with, we are negotiating with the United States, and we deal with Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons only. Therefore we fail to see any reason for the FRG to intrude in the Soviet-U.S. negotiations. Why? By what right? Has it not assumed an obligation under the nonproliferation treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons?

Let me repeat that it is only with the United States that we are negotiating an agreement that, if reached, will eliminate all nuclear warheads on two classes of arms of the two countries. But if we speak on all warheads, that certainly includes those on Pershing-1A missiles too. How can it be otherwise?

As to who owns the missile's fuel, the missiles' airframe, or, say, the wheels of its transporter, this is of no interest to us. We just proceed from the principle that zeros must be equal for both sides. If, however, the United States does not want a zero option, as is clear from its present "seventy-two equals zero" formula, that would be a different ball game.

We too have allies, who are concerned over the fact that a neighboring country retains shorter-range nuclear missiles that pose a great threat to their security. They could ask to station similar systems on their territories, and the Soviet Union could meet their request.

But what would a Soviet-U.S. agreement be like as a result of all this? It would be truncated, emasculated, and anemic.

Over the past few days the opponents of the "zero solution" have found another argument to try to bolster their untenable position on the Pershing-1A's. They are now saying that there is an imbalance in conventional and nuclear tactical arms in Europe and that these missiles have to be retained.

But are Bonn and Washington not aware that the Soviet leadership has been persistently calling for immediately starting negotiations to reduce conventional and nuclear tactical arms and to eliminate any disparities or imbalances where they exist?

Frankly, such tricks leave a dreadful impression, and they do nothing to help create trust in relations with our negotiating partners.

The Conference on Disarmament is not directly involved in dealing with the issue of medium-range and shorter-range missiles, but it does deal, and should deal, with the problem of nuclear disarmament and acts as a moral depository of the nonproliferation treaty. Therefore, we believe the conference could voice its authoritative opinion on whether the practice of joint ownership of nuclear arms by a nuclear and a nonnuclear state is consistent with that legal instrument.

This has to be done to prevent the nonproliferation treaty from being undermined. There can be no nuclear weapons on earth that are "no one's" weapons. It is extremely dangerous to create such a "legal sham."

If, as some U.S. Administration officials and their West German partners contend, those notorious Pershing-1A's are third-country systems, then the question arises again: How and by what right has that third country, namely, the FRG, to possess nuclear weapons? As far as we know, it has neither legal nor moral right to have them.

If it is deliberately trying to arrogate to itself such rights, if the FRG has indeed illegally acquired nuclear weapons, then this would certainly cause anger and indignation in the world and could confront the world with a political crisis.

We believe it is appropriate to ask the FRG representative at this forum a straightforward question: Does his country have nuclear systems in its arsenal?

Equally legitimate is the question we are addressing to the U.S. delegate: Who actually controls the nuclear warheads for the Pershing-1A's?

A great deal depends on the answer to these two questions, including:

The fate of an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles;

The future of the nonproliferation treaty;

The reassessment that the Soviet Union would be forced to make of the overall strategic situation in terms of the threat to its national interests posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a country where even today the insane slogans of revanchism are being heard trying to drown out the voices of sober-minded political and public figures, and mass movements calling for a responsible approach to European and world affairs.

The Soviet Union hopes the FRG will fully clarify the situation and remove the concerns now being felt by many European states because of the ambiguity of its position in regard to the Pershing-1A missiles.

We wish to make it perfectly clear that unless this is done, the Soviet Union will find the situation as it exists now unacceptable and will make known its view on that situation in a clear manner. The Soviet people will never acquiesce in West Germany becoming a nuclear power.

One would like to believe the FRG is well aware of all this and that ultimately the healthy forces that advocate detente and a major step in nuclear disarmament will prevail there. One would like to believe the FRG will not become an obstacle to attaining a historic agreement. Currently, 72 U.S. nuclear warheads stand between us and an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles. According to the U.S.-West German rules of "dual accounting," they are made to weigh more than all the two thousand nuclear warheads that could be deactivated and scrapped starting later this year.

A Soviet-U.S. accord on the total elimination of two categories of nuclear arms is a necessary prologue to solving the main problem of eliminating strategic offensive arms and preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space.

Mr President,

It is my privilege to inform you, upon instructions from the Soviet leadership, of the objective the Soviet Union is seeking to achieve. They include:

The conclusion of treaties with the United States and of international agreements on the complete destruction of nuclear weapons worldwide;

A strict and universal ban on deployment of any arms in outer space;

The establishment of an international regime under which there will be no chemical weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in the world;

The reduction of conventional weapons to the lowest possible levels required for defense;

The establishment, on the basis of cooperation among all states in the world, of a comprehensive system of international security, under which the United Nations could, in accordance with its charter, effectively maintain peace and security.

Allow me to outline to you the sequence of our practical actions to achieve these objectives:

First, at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms the Soviet delegation has been instructed to proceed from the "global double-zero" formula. Agreement has been reached to hold a meeting with the U.S. secretary of state in mid-September, as a separate event not linked to the session of the UN General Assembly.

Second, at the Geneva negotiations we have submitted a draft treaty on the 50-percent reduction in strategic arms and a draft agreement on strengthening the regime of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. These are compromise drafts taking into account and seeking to accommodate the positions of the other side.

Third, the Soviet side has cosponsored, together with other socialist countries, and submitted to the Conference on Disarmament for its consideration a document entitled "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Testing." We have proposed an initiative concerning the establishment of an international verification system to prevent the deployment of any weapons in outer space.

Fourth, a proposal by a group of socialist countries to establish a comprehensive system of international peace and security is being discussed at the United Nations.

I would like to address the question of verification and its fundamental and practical aspects.

The experience of the past few years has shown there is verification spoken of for propaganda purposes, and there is real, permanent verification.

Now, I would say the philosophy underlying our approach to the problem of real verification gives a particularly full and clear idea of the evolution of our outlook, which has now developed into a system of unorthodox political views, in other words, into a new political thinking.

Foolproof, indisputable, reliable, and the most strict and rigorous methods providing 100-percent confidence that weapons are indeed being eliminated, that obligations relating to the remaining weapons and permitted military activities are being complied with and that the bans are not being circumvented, this, and no less than this, is the verification that we envision.

The Soviet Union is proposing an exceptionally wide variety of forms and methods of verification both national and international. All of them have been set forth in detail in the document submitted to your forum on 9 June 1987 concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing, and, by the way, some of them have already been and are being used in practice. I would like to remind you that U.S. scientists equipped with appropriate monitoring instruments stayed for a long time near our nuclear test site. The USSR Academy of Sciences has reached a new agreement with American Colleagues to station monitoring equipment and exchange relevant data.

It is worth recalling that a short time ago our country made an extraordinary effort to achieve a cessation of nuclear testing. For a long time, we were observing our unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, trying to persuade the United States to match our good example.

We ask the Conference on Disarmament to assist in achieving a Soviet-U.S. agreement banning nuclear tests. I wish to emphasize this is not a plea to take sides but rather an appeal for moral and political assistance in attaining a truly universal objective, which is to make nuclear testing past history.

However, for the time being nuclear testing continues, and you know who is to blame. Nuclear testing is still a fact of life for mankind.

It would be easier to reach agreement at the Soviet-U.S. talks if one could be sure that other states, too, support a ban on nuclear testing and stand ready to become parties to a relevant international treaty. For this reason, we believe the search for agreement at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations and the preparation of a comprehensive treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should be undertaken concurrently.

As a practical step to advance the preparation of such a treaty we propose setting up a special group of scientific experts, which would be assigned the task of submitting to the conference well-founded and agreed-upon recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapons tests.

We believe there is also a need to establish an international system of global radiation safety monitoring, involving the use of space communication links. Such a system would be useful for more effectively verifying compliance with a ban on nuclear testing, once such a ban is imposed. At the same time it could be used to monitor the extent of pollution of the atmosphere, the soil and ground, and the oceanic waters on a global and regional scale. It would also provide an additional safeguard in case of any malfunction or, particularly, accidents at nuclear power plants.

We establish a strong link between nuclear arms reduction -- at this stage, reductions in medium-range and shorter-range missiles -- and an accord on measures of verification.

They include an exchange of initial data concerning the two sides' missiles and verification of such data through on-site inspections.

We insist on a continuous monitoring of the process of destroying the missiles. Elimination of the relevant production base and infrastructure will also be subject to verification.

The verification system we propose is designed to create an atmosphere of absolute confidence that the agreement is not circumvented in any way.

Finally, we believe there should be mandatory access to Soviet and U.S. military facilities in third countries where missiles could be stationed.

As you can see, we expand the area of confidence to a maximum extent by opening up USSR territory to inspections. However, complete confidence naturally presupposes complete reciprocity. An example and a confirmation of this is Stockholm and the decisions adopted there. This, I would say, is the material expression of the principle of

confidence; this is new political thinking in action. Naturally, we would like its geographic scope not to be confined to one continent.

In our opinion, verification will have a particularly important role to play in preventing an arms race in space.

We would be extremely grateful if you took a close look at the proposal for establishing an international verification system to ensure outer space remains peaceful. Is not the idea of inspecting every space launch quite reasonable? There are as yet not that many space-launch centres in the world and the presence of international inspectors there would reliably guarantee that the objects placed in outer space are not weapons and are not equipped with any weapons. But we go even further and propose not merely a presence but a permanent presence of groups of inspectors at all space-launch sites. Information about each upcoming launch, including the location of the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of launch, would be given in advance to members of the inspectorate.

What doubts can there be about the sincerity of the verification proposals made by a nation that is very actively involved in launching space objects?

All states engaged in space activities would be placed in an absolutely equal position and permanent monitoring by inspectors would guarantee the reliability of verification. After all, a space-launch complex is something that cannot be hidden. In this case, the technology itself ensures a relative simplicity of verification and its effectiveness. Furthermore, our proposal provides for the right to conduct an on-site inspection should suspicion arise that a launch was carried out from an undeclared launch site.

And, in the event of a total ban on space-strike arms, the Soviet Union would be willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centers, etc.

If a state has no intention of putting weapons in space, there can be no reason for it to object to international inspections of its space activities.

Space is a common asset of all mankind. It is much more than a training ground for military technocrats who cast away traditional humanistic ideals. It is a sphere for a peaceful application of peaceful efforts. It is this vision of outer space that the Soviet Union intends to pursue most vigorously.

Reflections about space inevitably lead one to think about the roads that humanity has to travel to reach its cherished goals. Some of those distances have yet to be covered from beginning to end, others have been covered half way, and there are still others where the end of the road is already in sight.

I would like to make a few comments about one of the long-sought goals within reach and that the Conference on Disarmament has almost attained.

What we have in mind is an event of great universal significance: a complete ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles. Two-thirds of a century has passed since the first gas attack at Ypres, which marked the beginning of military use of those barbaric weapons of mass annihilation. Ever since, governments of many nations and various international forums have sought to devise legal constraints on the

production and use of lethal substances, but it is only now, in our time, that it is becoming possible to adopt a historic convention to that effect.

What could stand in the way of this? Only the attempts to draw up the draft of a future treaty with one hand while assembling canisters of binary chemical weapons with the other.

Need one say how immoral this is and how incompatible with the goal before us?

The Soviet Union will continue to cooperate actively with all the participants in the Conference on Disarmament so that the long-awaited convention could become a reality. We did not dramatize the debates and differences that emerged in the process. Only one thing was considered absolutely imperative: the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles should be adopted as early as possible.

I am instructed to inform you that the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without right of refusal. This decision is another vivid manifestation of our commitment to genuine and effective verification in accordance with the principles of new political thinking.

To build an atmosphere of trust and in the interests of an early conclusion of an international convention, the Soviet side invites the participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of our chemical weapons and observe the technology of destroying chemical weapons at a mobile facility. We will later invite experts to the specialized plant for destroying chemical weapons now being built in near the town of Chapayevsk.

I am informing you of this in the hope that the conference participants will duly appreciate our desire to untie the most difficult problem knots that have appeared in the process of working out the convention.

Mr President,

Our external affairs are inseparable from our internal development, and the policy of restructuring, renewal, democratization and openness moves us to act in a positive manner wherever the Soviet Union is represented, including here at the Conference on Disarmament.

Today, as never before, the most pressing problems of the contemporary world determine the role and importance of the conference. In fulfilling its mission, this representative conference can assert itself more forcefully by practical deeds matching the magnitude of the tasks before it.

There may be a need to consider the possibility of adopting a more intensive work schedule. We would consider a year-round schedule for the conference with two or three recesses favorable.

Why not hold an additional session of the conference this year to complete most of the drafting of the convention banning chemical weapons?

Currently it is impossible for the conference to work with high efficiency without establishing an optimum balance between bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the

problems of security. There should be no antagonism here but rather the principle of complementary and mutually enriching interaction.

The practice of promptly informing conference participants about the status of Soviet-U.S negotiations, particularly on the questions relating to items on the agenda of your forum, could be a first step in this direction. We intend to discuss this with our American partners and establish an appropriate procedure. We hope to be able to find mutual understanding with them.

Why are we talking about the need to intensify the work of the conference? Because the negotiating machinery is running at a rate significantly slower than that of the arms race. A dangerous gap is emerging between political thought and political will, and military technology. This is evident from the records of the conference, too: It has been 15 years since the conclusion of the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, and the convention banning military use of environmental modification techniques was worked out in 1977.

The Soviet Union regards improvement in the functioning of the Geneva forum as one way of redressing this disparity. We believe that in time the conference could become a permanent universal body for disarmament negotiations.

And, of course, the Conference on Disarmament should not get used to the fact that the questions of ending the nuclear arms race, though they appear on its agenda, are actually not discussed here. Indeed, these issues should be made the focus of its activity. Today there is no other way. Nuclear disarmament cannot be the province of just a few powers. No government can stand on the sidelines in this matter for the nuclear threat is global in its consequences. Those consequences transcend national boundaries and ideological differences. They do not recognize neutrality and they would spare no one.

If that is so, it is unfair to keep nonnuclear states from participating in solving the problems of nuclear disarmament. As Mikhail Gorbachev has repeatedly emphasized, a maximum degree of internationalization is needed in these efforts. Genuine democratism and humanism in international relations call for precisely such an approach.

Proceeding from this premise, the Soviet Union will act constructively to enhance the prestige of the conference as the principal nuclear disarmament forum not just for exchanging views but for adopting the most responsible decisions.

Time is bringing us closer to the moment when word will finally become deed. The time of accomplishments is at hand -- the accomplishments of which we have long been dreaming and toward which we have travelled long and difficult roads.

May there be your contribution, too, in these accomplishments. May it be tangible, substantive and significant.

The USSR foreign minister's speech was heard with great attention and aroused tremendous interest among the conference participants and all those present today in the Council Hall of Geneva's Palace of Nations.

Meets With Kampelman

AU070936 Paris AFP in English 0934 GMT 7 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva, August 7 (AFP) -- Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met the U.S. disarmament negotiator for private talks here Friday expected to concentrate on the siting of Pershing missiles in West Germany, both men said.

The discussions at the Soviet diplomatic mission with negotiator Max Kampelman would also focus on preparations for Mr. Shevardnadze's September meeting with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, the two diplomats said.

Mr. Shevardnadze said Thursday tht the West German problem was holding up talks but his demand for the joint-owned West German-U.S. missiles to be part of any bilateral agreement was seen by the American mission here as intimidating and creating artificial obstacles.

He was to give a press conference at the Soviet mission Friday before flying back to Moscow.

Receives Kampelman, Gives News Conference

LD071241 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1222 GMT 7 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva, 7 Aug (TASS) -- E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister met here today with representatives of the delegations of the socialist countries at the Geneva disarmament conference -- the ambassadors of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Cuba, the Mongolian People's Republic, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, and also the Vietnam Socialist Republic observer.

This morning he received and talked with Ambassador M. Kampelman, the head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons.

E.A. Shevardnadze held a new conference for Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons.

There was a meeting [time not given] of the aktiv of officials of Soviet institutions in Switzerland at which E.A. Shevardnadze delivered a report.

Discusses Arms Talks

LD071735 Moscow TASS in English 1713 GMT 7 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva August 7 TASS -- "The world today has become a place where issues concerning the interests of a great number of states, let alone the international community, cannot be solved in a [word indistinct] circle," Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said here today. "The Soviet delegation has arrived in Geneva, first of all, to express support for the conference on disarmament," he told a press conference before returning home.

The Soviet minister dwelt upon progress at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons. He compared these talks with a two-engine aircraft which is kept aloft by one engine, the Soviet one. The minister cited as an example the verification problem.

"Once we propose some real methods and ways of verification, our Western partners promptly lose interest in them and find a new area for polemics," Eduard Shevardnadze said.

Other examples can be cited too, the Soviet minister said, "and all of them will confirm that the engine on the American wing of the talks has been malfunctioning so far." Eduard Shevardnadze called on the American side to "bring the second engine to full power as well".

The Soviet Foreign minister reminded that the Soviet Union had handed to the American delegation in Geneva draft agreements on strengthening the regime of the Treaty on Limiting ABM systems, and on implementing the understanding, reached in Reykjavik, on 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive weapons. At the level of delegations the Soviet side is given to understand that they see positive moments in this.

"However, there is no genuinely businesslike, principled and profound discussion at the talks," he noted.

Eduard Shevardnadze said that the behaviour of the American side in Geneva "caused certain disappointment". It should have made its contribution to the preparation of the meeting between foreign ministers of the USSR and the USA in September, so that "they had something to agree upon."

Today's meeting with the head of the American delegation in Geneva, Mr Kampelman, was devoted to this, the Soviet foreign minister continued. "We have come to the conclusion that, despite many outstanding issues and deep-going differences at the talks, there are certain reserves to make better preparations for the ministers' meeting and achieve significant progress in some issues, especially in the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles and to step up the work of our delegations on strategic offensive weapons and space," Eduard Shevardnadze said.

'Common Sense Will Prevail'

LD071931 Moscow TASS in English 1853 GMT 7 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva August 7 TASS -- Eduard Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, answered correspondents' questions at a press conference here today.

In answer to the question what kind of a mutually acceptable solution on medium-range missiles could be with as view to getting out of the impasse brought on by the Pershing-1A missile issues, Eduard Shevardnadze said that the missiles should be eliminated.

"All sober-minded people should agree with this", he said. "The proposed idea that the Federal Republic of Germany could eliminate its Pershing-1A missiles if the Soviet Union, for its part, reduced part of battlefield missiles, is beside point, since these are different classes of weapons. The point in question now is to eliminate medium- and shorter-range missiles, whereas the offered class of arms belongs to tactical weapons. This is a separate issues, a separate problem, and a separate subject for negotiations."

"As regards space weapons", the Soviet minister emphasized, "there are so far very few elements of mutual understanding at the talks with the United States. There is a

fundamental and deep divergence of opinion. The Soviet Union comes out against the development of space arms and is in favour of keeping outer space weapons-free, while the United States wants to implement its 'Stars Wars' programme at all costs".

The minister of foreign affairs of the USSR pointed out the fact that the conference on disarmament on Thursday the Soviet Union had tabled some proposals with a view to enhancing the role, authority, prestige and effectiveness of the conference.

"Most participants in the conference in principle approve of such an approach. People who regard it approvingly are those who are vitally interested in securing serious successes on disarmament issues and, first of all, in the cause of eliminating nuclear weapons, nuclear arsenals, chemical weapons, and other types of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, there are also those who disagree with such approach."

"But I think, common sense will prevail. The potentialities of the conference are really great", Eduard Shevardnadze said.

Answering a question about the situation in the Persian Gulf area, the minister pointed out that the situation there was unpredictable and very complex.

"At present everyone should particularly see to it that the mission of the U.N. secretary-general be a success. This is the first point".

"The second point is that it is essential to pool the efforts of all countries and all peoples to eliminate the prime cause of the situation which has taken shape in the Iran-Iraq conflict".

"The third point is that it is necessary to seek the elimination of military confrontation in the Gulf, which manifests itself in the presence of ships and other types of armaments of great powers, particularly those of the United States. The number of these grows with every passing day, and the situation has really become explosive."

Eduard Shevardnadze pointed out with satisfaction that the idea of convening an international Middle East peace conference meets with increasing understanding.

"This is gratifying", he said, "and one should not add utterly different issues to this such as, in particular, the question of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel or the departure of Soviet Jews abroad."

Pershings Block INF Accord

AU061024 Paris AFP in English 1018 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva, August 6 (AFP) -- The siting of intermediate and short range (INF) nuclear weapons in West Germany is the main obstacle to disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said here Thursday. "The Soviet people will never accept West Germany becoming a nuclear power," he said at the United Nations disarmament conference. Mr. Shevardnadze said the 72 Pershing 1-A missiles in West Germany, jointly controlled by Bonn and Washington, were the main obstacle to a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the banning of INF missiles.

"If, as certain American leaders and their West German partners pretend, the Pershing 1-As belong to a third country, let us ask once again why and with what right does West Germany have nuclear weapons," Mr. Shevardnadze said. He said that if West Germany had nuclear weaponry in its own arsenal it would be creating a "world political crisis." It would jeopardise the Soviet-U.S. talks and create a situation where "our allies could demand the installation of similar systems on their territory and the Soviet Union could respond to their demand," said Mr. Shevardnadze.

Washington maintains that the Pershing rockets are West German, while the United States has control over their nuclear warheads.

'72-Zero Option'

AU061144 Paris AFP in English 1122 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva, August 6 (AFP) -- Mr. Shevardnadze said that it was impossible to have "nuclear weapons belonging to no one", adding, "who owns the fuel is unimportant." Either the Pershing 1-As belong to the United States, and should be included in the INF negotiations, or they belong to West Germany, which "has neither the legal nor moral right to possess them", because of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he added.

And he warned that Moscow might have to review the present world strategic position under the threat of possession of nuclear arms by a country "where even today the crazy slogans of revanchism can be heard."

Mr. Shevardnadze said that retaining the Pershings would amount to a 72-Zero-option instead of the "double-zero" option for the elimination of nuclear missiles in Europe that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had accepted. He rejected the argument that the Pershings were to counter Soviet supremacy in conventional forces, saying the Soviet leadership was constantly calling for the opening of negotiations to end imbalance.

Noting that Moscow had made such concessions as not including the British and French nuclear deterrents in the INF negotiations, and admitting that the Soviet Union had a greater number of intermediate missiles, Mr. Shevardnadze said that on the settlement of the Pershing dispute depended not only an INF accord but the resolution of the main problem, "the elimination of strategic offensive weapons and the prevention of the arms race spreading into space."

The Soviet foreign minister also said that with regard to a future international ban on chemical weapons Moscow accepted the need for the principle of inspections on demand without right of refusal to ensure the accord was respected.

Returns to Moscow

LD071601 Moscow TASS in English 1539 GMT 7 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 7 TASS -- Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of foreign affairs, returned from Geneva to Moscow Today.

He was met at the airport by Nikolay Slyunkov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Anatoliy Kovalyev, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and other officials.

White House Comments

LD070523 Moscow TASS in English 0517 GMT 7 Aug 87

[Text] Washington August 7 TASS -- A White House spokesman Thursday said the U.S. Administration agreed With Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's remarks at the disarmament conference in Geneva about the possibility of achieving an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles.

Answering questions from reporters at a regular White House briefing, he added, however, that his country had not believed, did not believe and would not believe it possible to include 72 West German Pershing-1A missiles in the agreement.

He thereby reaffirmed Washington's reluctance to remove the last hindrance to realizing the "double zero option."

After being reminded that issue concerned American nuclear warheads for Pershing-1A's rather than the missiles themselves, the spokesman replied that the United States was not going to negotiate on the missile system of third countries.

Carlucci Comments From FRG

LD062246 Moscow TASS in English 2222 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Text] Bonn August 6 TASS -- Frank Carlucci, assistant of the U.S. President for national security affairs, who is currently in the Federal Republic of Germany, assured Bonn today that the United States would not make any concessions over the issues of 72 West German Pershing-1A missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads intended for them.

He stated this during a meeting with Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU-CSU group in the Bundestag, and his deputy Volker Ruehe.

At the close of the meeting, Volker Ruehe told journalists that Frank Carlucci stated clearly on behalf of the President that nothing had changed and would not change in the U.S. stand on the issue and that the missiles were not subject to discussion at the Soviet-U.S. talks.

"We have repeatedly stated," Alfred Dregger told journalists, "that the Pershing-1A missiles are not the subject of discussion, and that the FRG's stand on the issue remains the [as received] unchanged."

Thereby the United States and Bonn have shown once again their unwillingness to advance towards a solution to the issue concerning the Pershing-1A missiles and nuclear warheads for them. This hinders the nascent disarmament process.

FRG Spokesman Makes Statement

LD061754 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT 6 Aug 87

[Text] Bonn August 6 TASS -- Norbert Schaeffer, a press spokesman for the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), has made a statement in connection with the speech delivered at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament by Eduard Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

The spokesman pointed out that "the FRG is not a nuclear power and does not want to become such."

"As far as nuclear warheads for Pershing-1A missiles are concerned," the spokesman went on to say, "they belong exclusively to the United States."

"The U.S. stand on this issue at the Geneva talks finds support among all allies of Washington, including the FRG," the spokesman said.

Kampelman's Response to Speech

LD071832 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 7 Aug 87

[Text] Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-U.S. negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva, said in a television interview for CBS and NBC that he is not worried about the fact that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze did not resist the temptation to engage in a bit of propaganda in his speech in Geneva: I don't take it too seriously, Kampelman said.

Here is a latest news commentary: Viktor Levin is at the microphone.

[Levin] What Comrade Shevardnadze said is very serious, and therefore his speech in Geneva has prompted a widespread response. All the world is talking about it today. This speech not only again confirms the sincerity of the intention of the Soviet Union to set about eliminating nuclear arms right now, immediately, but also introduces new, very far-reaching proposals on the establishment of a system of international verification [kontroll] of the maintenance of peaceful space, and on the banning and elimination of chemical weapons. The Soviet minister also stressed the necessity of eliminating U.S. nuclear warheads for the West German Pershing-1A missiles, which is, in essence, the last obstacle in the way of elaborating a Soviet-U.S. agreement on medium-range and operational and tactical missiles on a global basis. He stressed the importance of this problem in a very weighty and convincing manner.

Today, however, while saying quickly that the speech contains interesting and positive points, spokesmen for the United States, and after them for the FRG, are trying to shoot down and destroy the Soviet approach to the warheads for the West German missiles. Kampelman, as the excerpts from his interview testify, is trying to brush off the statement by Comrade Shevardnadze by calling it propaganda, but that's an old trick: When you haven't got anything relevant to say, you hurry to declare that the other side's position is propaganda -- which, in the view of the authors of such declarations, is intended to denote a lack of seriousness.

A White House spokesman was more frank [otkrovennyy]. He said that the United States -- and I quote -- has not, does not and will not consider it possible to include the 72 West German Pershing-1A missiles in an accord. But we aren't talking about the missiles but about the warheads on them. When the White House spokesman was asked directly about the warheads, he repeated: We do not intend to conduct negotiations on the missile systems of third countries. This statement, in essence, confirms how well-founded was the question posed by the Soviet minister: Who actually has any control over nuclear warheads on the Pershing-1A missiles?

Another question of fundamental importance was discussed to a spokesman for the FRG: Does this country have any nuclear weapons among its armaments? Ambassador von Stuelpnagel, head of the FRG delegation at the disarmament conference, replied at this

point that the nuclear warheads on the Pershing-1A missiles are not under the control of the FRG -- in which case, why are both Washington and Bonn going on about missile systems of third countries, placing the FRG, essentially, in the same class as Britain and France?

The Soviet Union has unmasked a sordid game and shown how dangerous it is. Those 72 U.S. nuclear warheads are being used as an obstacle on the way to the elimination of 2,000 items of nuclear ammunition. The stubborn repetition of the notorious untruth about systems of third countries and the subterfuges to which Kampelman is resorting cannot conceal the indisputable fact that the United States, together with Bonn, is trying to emasculate the agreement on eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles on a global basis. This means that they are preventing a step of historic importance: the start of real destruction of highly modern armaments.

Foreign Ministry Press Briefing

PM081925 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Kuvshinnikov report: "They Regard Politics as a Strong-arm Game. From Our Correspondent at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Excerpt] One of the first reactions to the speech by E.A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR foreign minister, at the Geneva Conference came from M. Kampelman, who heads the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms. He described the Soviet "global double-zero" proposal as an "effective propaganda stunt."

"If that's a compliment," G. Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, who was chairing a routine briefing, declared, "we are prepared to refuse it." But this is also a sample of the thinking, the viewpoint that regards the Geneva talks as some kind of trial of strength. The U.S. side is now trying to outplay us by equating its 72 warheads on the West German Pershing-1A missiles to zero on the Soviet side. But this is a denial of the very essence of the talks, which are being conducted for the sake of coordinating the two countries' interests and finding a mutually acceptable solution to the problem.

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CSO: 5200/1616

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: U.S. BLAMED FOR LACK OF PROGRESS AT CSCE

Kashlev Statement

LD301422 Moscow TASS in English 1410 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Text] Vienna, 30 Jul (TASS)--The heads of the delegations of Bulgaria, Poland and the Soviet Union at the European meeting gave a press conference at the Vienna International Press Centre today.

In a statement to journalists Yuriy Kashlev, head of the USSR delegation, noted that the expectations shared by many delegations that the Vienna meeting would be concluded on July 31 have not been fulfilled.

We proceed from the fact that all the necessary prerequisites were at hand for a successful conclusion of the meeting, he stressed.

The international situation, which has taken shape to a large extent due to the active policy of the USSR aimed at overcoming obstacles in the way of nuclear disarmament, stopping nuclear tests and reducing conventional armaments, has been on the whole favourable.

The policies of the USSR on many issues discussed at the Vienna meeting are considerably influenced by the processes of perestroyka, democratization and glasnost which are taking place in the USSR.

A good base has been created at the Vienna meeting itself for reaching meaningful and mutually acceptable agreements: Some 150 proposals have been introduced on the entire scope of the Helsinki Final Act -- the fact that attests to the interests of participating states in developing the CSCE process.

The Soviet delegation is firmly convinced that it was the position of the NATO countries that prevented the Vienna meeting from being concluded by the target date. For its part, the Soviet delegation persistently tried to reverse the delaying trend, doing everything in its power to intensify the work and proceed with the drafting of the concluding agreement.

One of the main causes of the delay is that for more than half a year we have had to counter the dangerous course pursued by some Western countries for cutting off disarmament from the Helsinki process.

As regards military matters, the implementation of the Helsinki principles, compliance with trade and economic agreements, human rights, human contacts, questions of information and many other issues, we have an extensive list of claims to be presented to the Western countries because the obligations assumed by them in Helsinki and Madrid are not fulfilled, massive and gross violations of human rights continue, obstacles are being set in the field of scientific ties and information exchanges, etc.

Kashlev further laid down the tasks which, in the opinion of the USSR delegation, are to be tackled after the summer recess by the participants in the meeting in the military-political field, in the field of international law, in the "second basket", in the questions of humanitarian cooperation, etc.

Kashlev expressed the view that an important role in creating conditions for speedy progress at the final stage of the Vienna meeting will belong to the neutral and non-aligned countries.

The USSR delegation is convinced that only a responsible political approach to work, a genuine desire to bring positions closer together, a search for rational elements in the approaches of all participants and the understanding of the limits of what is possible today can help the Vienna meeting to arrive at agreements that would serve the interests of expanding cooperation among all CSCE participants.

IZVESTIYA Report

PM040927 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent N. Novikov under the rubric "Facts, Events, Opinions" and headlined "At the Vienna Meeting: A Missed Opportunity"]

[Text] Vienna -- All is quiet in the recently built Vienna conference center where the Vienna meeting is taking place. The summer break began on 1 August and lasts until 22 September.

This third break was unplanned. Contrary to the preliminary accord, the Vienna meeting did not complete its work on 31 July. Before the break there was a plenary session at which many delegation heads made speeches.

From their pronouncements it is easy to conclude that the all-European process is being perceived more and more tangibly by practically all the countries of the continent as a unique phenomenon politically indispensable for the Europeans and as a real avenue leading to positive advances in East-West relations.

Many Vienna meeting participants consider that all the necessary prerequisites were there for the successful completion of the Vienna meeting. The international atmosphere was generally favorable.

At the Vienna meeting itself a good basis had been established for reaching mutually acceptable accords. [paragraph continues]

Around 150 proposals had been put forward on the entire spectrum of the Helsinki Final Act, 30 of them relating to further steps to be taken after the Vienna meeting.

The delegations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries did all they could to step up the forum's work and move on to editing the final document. Their approach to this work was highly flexible. The Soviet delegation made 25 specific proposals alone or in conjunction with other delegations. In a number of cases the Soviet delegation expressed a willingness to register texts taken from Western countries' proposals, but the Western delegations were opposed to working on the editing of a final document, refusing to record even their own proposals in it. This was one reason why the decision on completing the meeting by the planned date was not carried out.

The main reason, Soviet delegation head Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev said in his speech at the plenary session, is that we had to struggle for more than 6 months against the dangerous line pursued by certain Western countries of detaching disarmament from the Helsinki process. NATO still wants to deprive neutral and nonaligned countries of the right to discuss disarmament problems. Another reason why the Vienna meeting has been unnecessarily protracted is the premise of a number of Western delegations that the socialist countries are "debtors" in the CSCE process, whereas the West, apparently, has nothing to do in terms of Final Act fulfillment. It is on these grounds that they are stubbornly ignoring the socialist countries' proposals.

The results of the three rounds of the Vienna meeting clearly demonstrate that the solution of the important tasks facing the forum is possible only in a businesslike atmosphere, without any artificial fueling of sterile polemics and confrontation.

Kashlev PRAVDA Interview

PM030914 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Aug 87 Second Edition p 6

[Interview with Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev by unidentified PRAVDA correspondent in Vienna: "Dialogue Will Continue"; date not given--first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Excerpt] The latest round of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the CSCE states has ended in the Austrian capital. PRAVDA's correspondent asked Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation, to answer a few questions.

[PRAVDA] Yuriy Borisovich! The all-European meeting in Vienna has been at work for 7 months "net" (not counting the breaks). What are the results as of today?

[Kashlev] As yet we can only speak of preliminary or interim results. Chief among these is that certain prerequisites have been created for an agreement that after Vienna, the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe will continue, and talks probably will begin on conventional arms and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

With regard to the continuation of the Stockholm conference, this is advocated by virtually all the delegations taking part in the Vienna meeting. True, there are different opinions on what new confidence-building measures it should examine. Nor is there unity of approach to the objectives and tasks of the new talks on conventional arms, for which a mandate is being elaborated here in Vienna, at consultations between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The NATO draft mandate submitted here a few days ago at the "last minute" does not contain an adequate response to the Warsaw Pact countries' large-scale proposals.

'Unrealistic' Western CSCE Efforts

LD041454 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1340 GMT 4 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow, 4 Aug (TASS) -- More favorable conditions than those in Belgrade and Madrid have been created for the work of the CSCE's third stage after Helsinki, Yuriy Kashlev, head of the USSR delegation at the Vienna meeting and ambassador at large, has said. He spoke today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Describing these favorable conditions, he said that the Soviet side had put forward important peace initiatives. Margaret Thatcher, Jacques Chirac, Richard Von Weizsaecker and other prominent Western political leaders had visited Moscow. The whole world is talking about restructuring in the Soviet Union and the course toward democratization and glasnost. All of this has had a positive effect upon the character of the discussions that are being conducted within the framework of the all-European process.

In this regard, Ambassador Kashlev gave the following example: During 6 months of this year about 9,000 people have left the Soviet Union to take up permanent residence abroad for family reasons -- twice as many as last year.

A good foundation for the achievement of substantial, mutually acceptable accords also was created at the Vienna meeting itself. About 150 proposals were put forward over the whole spectrum of the Helsinki Final Act, which testifies to the interest of all participant states in the development of the CSCE process.

The main reason preventing the Vienna meeting from being completed within the planned time-scale lies in the fact that for more than 6 months the Soviet delegation has had to struggle against the dangerous line of some Western countries aimed at separating disarmament from the Helsinki process. Considerable efforts have been required to preserve this set of problems within the CSCE. Although the NATO countries still strive to deprive the neutral and nonaligned countries of the right to discuss problems of disarmament, one-third of the countries participating in the CSCE are not admitted to the talks on conventional armaments.

Only in the final month of the work of the Vienna conference was an accord reached that corresponded to the provisions of the Madrid Mandate to keep the possibility of reviewing questions of disarmament in Europe within the framework of the CSCE and the right of all 35 states to be party to this. An extension was successfully agreed upon to the mandate of the conference to strengthen measures of trust, security, and disarmament in Europe, which would ensure embarking upon new and more effective measures of trust. Several other important accords also were reached. Moreover, the NATO countries introduced their draft mandate for future talks on conventional weapons 3 days before the end of the talks in Vienna.

A further reason that hampered constructive work at the Vienna meeting lies in the unrealistic attempts by countries in the West to "haggle" for concessions of some kind from the socialist countries with the help of delays and procrastination. This was particularly noticeable in the final speeches of a number of Western representatives.

According to their logic, said Yuriy Kashlev, the longer we stay in Vienna, the more advantages the West will extract from the internal processes in our country. We must disappoint them: Any attempts to get unilateral advantages out of staying longer or to force on us their one-sided view of human rights and democracy have no future.

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN EXTOLS JARUZELSKI PLAN

LD301819 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1338 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jul (TASS) -- The Soviet Union notes with satisfaction the comprehensive and large-scale nature of the PPR Government's memorandum on arms reduction and enhancing trust in central Europe, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, stated at a briefing today. This is unquestionably an important step on the way to achieving real progress in the business of disarmament and reinforcing trust in Europe. The "Jaruzelski Plan" creates new and extremely important opportunities for reinforcing the pan-European process.

This plan, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted, is distinctive in its breadth of approach and flexibility, because it contains an appeal to all the sides concerned for a free discussion of the Polish initiative or its basic components, without prior conditions or demands. The Soviet Union welcomes the initiative from our Polish friends and will take the most active and direct part in its implementation.

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CSO: 5200/1609

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: WARSAW PACT EXERCISES IN GDR DESCRIBED

CDE Observers Attend

PM280905 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jul 87 Second Edition p 6

[Report by special correspondent A. Gorokhov: "Special Post"]

[Excerpts] Group of Soviet Forces in Germany--In West Berlin's Tiergarten servicemen from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany guards unit billeted in the Berlin suburb of Karlshorst stand in a guard of honor at the monument to the Soviet soldiers. This post is held in special account among our armed forces... The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany stands with the GDR National People's Army at a special post to safeguard peace, on the front lines of socialism, on the line dividing the two military-political groupings -- NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization.

The Group [subhead]

What is the group of forces, what kind of a mechanism is it, so to speak? At any rate it is not a musical box which might be taken off to an antiquary at any moment. That moment has not yet come. Indeed, greasing the axles of this mechanism is now very costly and requires nationwide efforts...

It was with these thoughts that we emerged in our "Uazik" truck onto a road on the firing range of the Magdeburg training center.

The area surrounding the road showed no sign of human presence. Yet it turned out that the day before a whole division had been deployed here on defensive positions: 11,000-12,000 servicemen plus tanks, infantry combat vehicles and armored carriers, artillery, engineering equipment, command staff vehicles, plus... Actually, you would have to spend a long time adding pluses because scientific and technical process has literally burst into the domain of the infantry -- the "queen of the fields" -- and in the past 10-15 years has radically altered its appearance.

There are 78 divisions in combat readiness in the Warsaw Pact Organization. There are 94 in NATO, including French and Spanish divisions. The numerical strength of each division is greater than ours: from 16,000 to 23,000 men. But so far it is not a case of the correlation of forces. We are talking about how complex is this "mechanism" -- the Group of Forces -- which includes a mass of components necessary for efficient service and normal existence. Here the perturbing realities of the military-political situation determine the precision of this mechanism's operation. A high degree of precision, it must be said, on which the quality of defense depends. Because if the winder is weakened you may easily witness some international incident [attraktsion].

What is the reality?

"Not a day elapses," I was told by Colonel General N. Moiseyev, chief of the group's political directorate, "without NATO troop maneuvers being held close to the GDR borders. What is required of us? Firmness and calmness, readiness for an immediate rebuff, unity with our brothers in arms..."

It is impossible to encompass in a single attempt the kaleidoscope of the troops' daily life. Naturally, it is not made up solely of rosy hues. The collective is big -- its concerns are also big: from the combat readiness of units and subunits, discipline and order, to the "trivia" of the social sphere.

A few events and facts from this year... In March a joint exercise by units of the Group of Forces and the GDR National People's Army led by Army General V. Belikov, commander of the Group of Forces in Germany, was held with complete success. Taking part were 23,500 Soviet servicemen, 1,500 servicemen from the GDR, 500 tanks, and tactical aviation subunits. The exercise was observed by 20 states which took part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A similar event, to which observers are also invited, is scheduled for late July...

Balance [subhead]

When the tactical fighters with the insignia of the GDR and Soviet Union air forces, in the course of changes of attitude, steer course 270, that is due West, and Moenchengladbach (FRG) and Brunssum (Netherlands) where the headquarters of, respectively, the Central and Northern groups of armies and main command of the NATO Allied Armed Forces in the so-called Central European theater are located, a certain anxiety arises at these headquarters.

Is the Soviet Group of Forces Commander in Chief not beginning to "lay hands" on Western Europe in general and the FRG in particular? By chance coincidence or whatever, in the NATO military alert system one of the two states of the armed forces is called the "red" alert. It means that the Russians' offensive has already begun or will begin within the next few minutes. The "Soviet military threat," so to speak, but not as propaganda cliches but in the form of specific military instructions.

No, Army General V. Belikov and his staff do not intend to attack anyone. But they are keeping careful track of the "behavior" of the leadership of the more than one million-strong NATO grouping in the Central European theater. This grouping, which includes the Central and Northern groups of armies (7,000 tanks), the second and fourth allied tactical air commands (1,500 combat aircraft and 72 Pershing-1A launchers) is the main one in the NATO allied Armed Forces.

"This is not some army which lags behind the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany for all indicators," Valeriy Aleksandrovich noted. "It consists of crack units kept at wartime strength with a high degree of combat readiness..."

I should add that the grouping's strike power can be intensified by transferring to it the 108 Pershing 2 medium-range ballistic missile launchers stationed in the FRG.

Do the officers and generals serving in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany realize that a spark is enough between the two poles brought so close to turn the all-European house into a nuclear crematorium? Undoubtedly. That is why their attention is so keen toward practical measures to reduce the level of military antagonism in Europe and to develop dialogue between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO, which the Warsaw Pact Organization persistently advocates.

"The NATOites admit themselves," I was told by a colonel who has dealings with the Soviet Euromissile initiatives [imeyushchiy otnosheniye k predmety sovetskikh initsiativ po yevroraketam] and therefore asked for his name to be given, "that they can turn out tanks and aircraft like pancakes. But you can only be amazed at their way of counting our combat units. For instance, we have a tank waiting to be sent for scrap but over there it turns out that it is being counted. So that's how they do it...

"So far what is happening is that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is seeking a response to a possible Euromissiles agreement: It is studying ways of deploying additional U.S. nuclear arms on European territory or somewhere in the vicinity."

Exercise [subhead]

The exercise which I had the opportunity to attend was one of the first which was also attended, in keeping with the accords of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament, by foreign observers from 20 countries, including 11 NATO countries. Let me add that a total of 25 exercises in different regions of Warsaw Pact countries have been planned for this year. These are so-called notifiable military activities. Observers will be present at nine of them.

I will not burden the reader with descriptions of the attempts by the "blues" to penetrate the "orange" defenses, the counterattack by the "orange," or tales about the landing in force, the collaboration between ground forces and the Air Force, or the work done by the artillery. The usual expression is: The set goals were achieved.

Despite the sensational nature of the first official appearance in history of Bundeswehr officers on GDR territory, a deeper impression was made on me by the meeting with U.S. Brigadier General Philip H. Mallory. I remember the question he asked in all seriousness, a question which would have stunned anyone: "And what is Yuriy Gagarin doing now?" I had to tell him what had happened to the world's first cosmonaut. But that is an aside. As for the exercises which had just ended, the brigadier general, who serves in the 7th Army Corps of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe, later remarked:

"Confidence-building measures are very important. Everything we saw here in the past 4 days has helped this. We were convinced of the practical implementation of the provisions of Stockholm conference's final document. This is an important beginning..."

Exercises End 31 July

LD312000 Moscow TASS in English 1609 GMT 31 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 31 TASS -- Joint exercises of the group of Soviet troops in Germany and the National People's Army of the GDR ended today.

Troop control and interaction of various services were practised in the course of the exercises. According to the command of the exercises they were instructive and demonstrated an increased level of the field training of troops.

The aims set by the exercises were achieved and the troops that took part in them are returning to the places of their permanent deployment.

Observers from member countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were present at the exercises. They were invited in accordance with an accord reached at the Stockholm Conference.

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CSO: 5200/1609

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS ANALYST MARKS TEST BAN TREATY ANNIVERSARY

LDO41408 Moscow TASS in English 1313 GMT 4 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

Twenty four years ago, on August 5, 1963, representatives of the USSR, the United States and Britain signed in Moscow the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water.

This treaty signified a major step in the struggle to restrict the nuclear arms race, even though it did not encompass all nuclear explosions. It signified an important victory of the policy of peaceful coexistence over the policy of cold war, of the diplomacy of negotiations over the policy of banking on strength in international relations, of concern for the health and welfare of people over disregard for the demands, interests and the very destiny of mankind.

It was also important that this treaty ensured the elimination of one of the key sources of our planet's radioactive contamination.

For prior to 1963 about 200 million tons of earth contaminated with radioactivity were ejected into the atmosphere as a result of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests.

It should be specially stressed that the then President of the United States John Kennedy and his closest associates viewed the treaty as an important agreement on restraining the nuclear arms race and clearing the atmosphere of radioactive waste, as a starting point for further measures aimed at easing international tension. In John Kennedy's opinion political changes in the atmosphere were even more important than physical ones, it was subsequently recalled by one of his assistants, Theodore Sorensen. A symbolical "first step", a harbinger of further agreements -- this was how the treaty was regarded on both sides of the Atlantic.

The certain changes in the American Administration's policy of the time showed that moderate and realistic trends began to manifest themselves in the formation of the future foreign policy of the United States and that recognition of the realities of the nuclear age and of the obtaining international situation began to make itself felt. The "inconceivability" of nuclear war was increasingly realised. The President was gravitating to the thought that the interests of the United States would be better served by a policy of improving and not of worsening relations with the USSR, by restraining and not encouraging the more reactionary and aggressive forces inside the United States. Concrete steps in the direction of detente were made possible exactly because the administration moved to more realistic positions taking into account the changes taking place in the world.

The Soviet Union made a big effort to continue this process, to make it possible jointly with the United States and then with the other nuclear powers to avert the modernisation of nuclear arsenals and the development of ever more lethal nuclear weapons, to create conditions for the "withering away" of nuclear weapons. The Soviet unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions lasted for more than 18 months and during that time the USSR had repeatedly called on the United States to join it.

But the present United States Administration refuses to stop the nuclear arms race and start drafting a treaty in the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Some people in Washington are still entertaining hopes of achieving strategic military superiority.

The absence of agreement on the total ending of nuclear tests has already resulted in the creation of MIRVed warheads, in a ten-fold increase on the number of nuclear warheads and the appearance of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. In future, if a barrier is not erected, there will appear various types of "third generation" nuclear weapons, including those designed for "Star Wars".

By its actions the present United States Administration shows that despite all its declarations about love of peace it is acting contrary to the main demand of our nuclear-space age. It is long time for Washington to respond to the Soviet call to open an important stage in international relations and clear the road to the attainment of agreement on the total ending of nuclear explosions.

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CSO: 5200/1614

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET PAPER VIEWS U.S. 'PRESSURE' ON NORWAY OVER NORDIC NFZ

PM031219 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[Colonel I. Vladimirov article: "Under Pressure From Washington"]

[Excerpts] On returning to power in May last year, the Norwegian Labot Party emphasized in its program statement its readiness to "devote great attention to maintaining good and correct relations with the Soviet Union" and to struggle actively for detente and against the nuclear arms race. Those principles have been reflected in a number of practical steps by the government of G. Harlem Brundtland.

In particular, Norway did not support the U.S. plans to resume production of chemical weapons and declared that it would not participate in consultations on the question of their placement and that it advocates the ending of nuclear tests. Oslo opposed the militarization of space and reacted with concern to their transatlantic partner's undermining of the SALT II Treaty.

Unlike its predecessor, the present Norwegian Government displays greater realism with regard to the consequences of imparting permanence of the U.S. naval and NATO presence in the Norwegian Sea. It has had the idea of concluding multilateral agreements between countries on the shores of northern seas and states which conduct military activity in them, with a view to averting possible conflicts. Finnish President M. Koivisto's proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe in conjunction with confidence-building measures in that region did not go unnoticed in Oslo. "It is very important to strive for guaranteed confidence-building measures, particularly in the sphere of military activity in the Norwegian Sea," Norwegian Defense Minister J.J. Holst pointed out.

The country's public actively supported its government's position aimed at strengthening regional stability. This is certainly no coincidence. For the scale of U.S. and NATO military activity in northern regions poses a direct threat to the Scandinavian countries' security. At the same time, the "nuclear" and "base" policy proclaimed by Norway, whose essence, as is known, consists in not permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons or foreign troops and military bases on its territory in peacetime, is being worn down. The NATO countries, especially the United States, are constructing heavy arms dumps, airfields, radar and radio navigation stations, and other military projects there. The NATO command has begun regularly holding exercises of the bloc countries' armed forces in Norway. As a result, there are foreign troops on Norwegian territory practically all the time.

Recently Washington has also been trying hard to secure the Norwegian side's consent to the presence of U.S. aircraft carriers off the Norwegian coast with a view to realizing its "new sea strategy." The essence of this overtly aggressive concept is that the U.S. Navy should be capable of conducting offensive operations against the USSR within its own territorial waters and making strikes against targets located deep within the Soviet Union. This is why the Pentagon is dying to establish its own control over the Norwegian Sea. However, the Norwegian Government takes a guarded attitude toward the demands of its "senior partner."

Attempts are being made to call to order the ally who is refusing to follow blindly the prescribed course, by organizing a clearly U.S.-inspired campaign of pressure on Norway. Canada's refusal to transfer its troops to northern Norway in the event of a crisis in Europe can hardly be considered accidental. The hint is clear -- either rely on your own forces or turn to the United States for assistance. White House emissaries have taken to visiting Oslo with persistent blandishments to "see reason." NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington has visited the Norwegian capital to remind his interlocutors of the notorious "Atlantic solidarity."

It evidently proved beyond the ability of the Norwegian Government to withstand such strong pressure. During his recent visit to Washington Defense Minister J.J. Holst had to agree to the setting up of a mixed group of experts to study ways to improve NATO'S antisubmarine defense system in northern Europe. It is expected to examine the possibilities of stepping up monitoring of the actions of the USSR Navy, as well as increasing joint exercises by the U.S. and Norwegian Navies' submarine forces in Norwegian waters. Although Holst justified the setting up of the group by citing the country's security interests, this step runs counter to the Norwegian Government's policy of maintaining a stable situation in northern regions of the European Continent. The United States intends to use cooperation with Norway in the antisubmarine defense sphere to lend permanence to the presence of carrier-borne strike groups in the Norwegian Sea.

The U.S. pressure on Norway is leading to an increase in the level of military confrontation in northern Europe. U.S. and NATO militarist activity on the northern flank will only complicate the search for ways to strengthen confidence and security in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1614

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

SEMIPALATINSK TEST 2 AUGUST--At 0500 Moscow time [0100 GMT] at a testing site in the Semipalatinsk area, an underground nuclear explosion of 20 to 150 kilotons was carried out. The test was for further improving military equipment. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 2 Aug 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1614

RELATED ISSUES

HUSAK, HONECKER SEND ANTINUCLEAR MESSAGE TO MUGABE

AU101626 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 8 Aug 87 p 1

[CTK report: "G. Husak's and E. Honecker's Letter To R. Mugabe; On a Nuclear-Free Corridor in Central Europe"]

[Text] Harare (CTK) -- A joint letter from CSSR President Gustav and from Erich Honecker, chairman of the GDR State Council, on their two states' initiative, the objective of which is the establishment of a corridor without nuclear weapons in Central Europe, was presented to Robert Mugabe, chairman of the Nonaligned Movement and prime minister of Zimbabwe, in Harare on Friday [7 August].

In a talk with Ivan Zachar, CSSR charge d'affaires in Zimbabwe, and Christian Kleinhempel, GDR charge d'affaires in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe expressed thanks for the delivered message. He explicitly valued the CSSR and GDR initiative aimed at establishing a corridor without nuclear weapons in central Europe. He affirmed that the nonaligned countries support all similar steps leading to disarmament and to ensuring peace. The CSSR and GDR proposals for regional nuclear disarmament are in full accord with the objectives of the Nonaligned Movement and are, at the same time, a good foundation for a peaceful dialogue of all democratic forces at the upcoming session of the UN General Assembly.

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CSO: 5200/3016

PRAVDA CHIEF EDITOR CALLS FOR 'NEW THINKING' IN NUCLEAR AGE

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR in Russian No 2, Mar-Apr 87 (signed to press 3 Mar 87) pp 169-173

[Article by V.G. Afanasyev: "The New Political Thinking"]

[Text] The most acute problem confronting mankind today is that of war and peace. It is not in itself new: wars have always been "companions" of mankind. Scholars have calculated that in the 4,000 years-plus of recorded history only approximately 300 years of these have been completely peaceful. The rest of the time in a larger or smaller region of the world some people have been waging war against others. Up to the present century these were local wars--limited in terms of territory and the number of states participating. This type of war continues today also (the undeclared war against Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and so forth).

The 20th century engendered a new type of wars--world wars--in which dozens of countries and tens of millions of people participate. Mankind has experienced two such wars. In the first 38 states participated, 74 million men were mobilized, 10 million were killed and 20 million were wounded and shell-shocked. In the second there were 72 participating states, upto 110 million men were put under arms and total human losses amounted to 55 million.

The specter of a new world war--a monstrous, thermonuclear war--hovers in the air of our day. This is not a specter even but a real danger. The weapons for waging such a war exist--piles of nuclear weapons. There are also people capable of detonating these piles. It is a question of the darkest forces of imperialist reaction. If this war erupts, it will in all probability be the last war. Human civilization and, evidently, everything living on Earth will perish in the incinerating nuclear flame and in the all-destroying blast wave from the lethal radioactive poison.

To be or not to be for mankind--this is a far from Hamlet question. How to solve the problem of war and peace in favor of peace, how to preserve peace and ensure the progress of society and man? Very, very complex questions.

For an answer to these questions the former "prenuclear," "prespace" thinking in politics is no use. New political thinking corresponding to the contemporary historical conditions is needed here.

V.I. Lenin was at the source of this thinking. The basis thereof is Lenin's principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Lenin was profoundly convinced that socialism would sooner or later be victorious throughout the world. But this victory cannot be accomplished simultaneously, all at once in all countries. Depending on the degree of development of the economy, degree of seriousness of the class struggle, the correlation of social forces and also other conditions, some countries arrive at socialism earlier than others. Proceeding from this, Lenin concluded that in the course of a lengthy historical period, when capitalist states would exist together with the socialist states, coexistence, the joint existence in the world of socialist and capitalist countries, is inevitable. Lenin was a supporter of peaceful coexistence, and the Communist Party and the Soviet state have made this Leninist principle the basis of relations with capitalist countries.

Peaceful coexistence presupposes a renunciation of war and the use and threat of force as means of settling contentious issues and their solution by way of negotiations; noninterference in the internal affairs and consideration for the legitimate interests of one another; the right of peoples to independently dispose of their fate; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders; cooperation based on complete equality and mutual benefit; conscientious compliance with the commitments ensuing from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and from concluded international treaties.

V.I. Lenin lived and worked and thought and struggled when science was taking just the first steps along the path of penetration of the secrets of the atom, and its nucleus was still a mystery under seven seals. The nuclear danger which now hovers over mankind did not exist.

Since V.I. Lenin, particularly in recent decades, the historical situation has changed fundamentally. We have entered the nuclear-space age. A nuclear monster has been created, and with it mankind itself has found itself in tremendous danger. History itself has set theory and practice a fundamental task: how to preserve peace and prevent a nuclear conflagration and how, without closing our eyes to social, political and ideological contradictions, to master the science and art of behaving with restraint and circumspection in the international arena and living in civilized manner, that is, under the conditions of correct international intercourse and cooperation. The CPSU has accomplished this task. The concept of new political thinking corresponds to the questions which have just been raised.

Its basic ideas and premises are contained in the material of the 27th CPSU Congress. The modern world has become too small and fragile for wars and power politics, the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the congress observed. The world has become fragile inasmuch as it could disintegrate like a nut from a strike by a small number even of stockpiled nuclear bombs. The world has become small inasmuch as delivery systems have been created which are capable of delivering these bombs to any corner of the world in a matter of minutes. "It cannot be saved and preserved," the report says, "unless there is a break--decisive and irreversible--with the way of thinking and acting

which for centuries were constructed on the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts."

The renunciation of wars and power politics in the age of the atomic nucleus and space is the main premise of the concept of the new political thinking. This concept has been further developed in subsequent party documents and the speeches of the general secretary of the Central Committee. A big contribution to its development was made by the material and speeches of M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to India.

The concept of new political thinking means an in-depth and unprejudiced understanding of the nuclear-space realities of our time, an understanding that:

in our day, when weapons which have made the existence of mankind itself questionable have been created, the question can only be: coexistence or nonexistence. It is thus a matter not only of the competition and opposition of the two social systems but of a choice between survival and mutual annihilation;

the most complex problems, profound disagreements and conflicts of the present-day world may be solved not by means of science and technology and, even less, by way of military power and the force of arms but only politically, by way of negotiations;

differences in the social and political system and ideology and national, cultural and other singularities are not a barrier to dialogue in the name of peace. Not forgoing its national pride, interests and values one iota, each people and each country are obliged to know how to direct them toward the achievement of the main goal--the salvation of human civilization;

it is inconceivable that a nuclear war could be won, it could have no victors and no vanquished;

ideas concerning the achievement of military superiority are untenable and chimerical;

space belongs to all mankind, and its use by anyone for military purposes is inhumane and unlawful;

in order to survive mankind must prevent the militarization of space and eliminate nuclear weapons on Earth;

all countries of the world are interconnected and interdependent, all people live on one planet, whose name is Earth;

all countries, peoples and states--big, medium and small--must participate in the building of peace and dependable security;

the security of some countries cannot be ensured at the expense of others, security can only be equal, mutual and all-embracing--international security; there is one world, and its security is indivisible;

priority now needs to be given to human values inasmuch as the world belongs to man and the present and future generations;

human life should be recognized as the highest value inasmuch as man alone is the creator of the material and spiritual values at the disposal of society, and his creative genius alone secures progress and civilization under the conditions of peace.

While giving priority to general values and human life and championing a nonviolent world the CPSU is by no means abandoning a party- and class-minded approach to social processes and to wars. The main goal of the CPSU was and remains the ultimate goal of the working class--the building of communism. The CPSU supports the international workers, communist and national liberation movements and is conducting an implacable ideological struggle against its class enemy.

Marxists are not pacifists, they consider just--defensive and liberation--wars natural and logical.

The CPSU and the Soviet state engage in their practical deeds on the international scene strictly guided by the principles of the new political thinking. The preservation and consolidation of peace and the reduction in and then complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass annihilation--such is their principal foreign policy task. It could not be otherwise, after all, peace, as V.I. Lenin said, is the ideal of socialism. We need peace particularly urgently now inasmuch as it is only under the conditions of peace that the far-reaching programs of reconstruction and an acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development can be accomplished.

The party is exerting the maximum efforts to achieve this goal--the preservation of peace.

The program of the building of a nuclear-free world advanced by M.S. Gorbachev in the 15 January 1986 statement is imbued with a sense of tremendous responsibility for the fate of mankind and its survival. Acting by stages and consistently, as of 1986, which was declared by the United Nations the International Year of Peace, implementing and completing a process of the deliverance of the Earth from nuclear weapons has been possible, given, naturally, the complete renunciation of the creation of assault arms in space. If this program is accepted, it would take only 15 years to implement it and greet the third millennium without the threat of "nuclear winter" and under clear skies which would not be invaded by deadly nuclear clouds. But the tremendous efforts of governments, parties, all peace-loving forces and all peoples and states are needed for this. The program provides for the complete elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base of their manufacture itself and also a reduction in conventional arms and armed forces.

Important disarmament initiatives were presented at the 27th CPSU Congress. The CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the congress expressed a proposal concerning the creation of an all-embracing system of international

security and showed the fundamental bases of such a system in the military, political, economic and humanitarian spheres.

Exceptionally great, if not to say key, significance in the business of disarmament is attached to the question of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. Its positive solution would put an end to the qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons and initiate a reduction therein. It is necessary ultimately to stop and have done with the pointless and extremely dangerous nuclear arms race!

Clearly recognizing this, on 6 August 1986 (on this day 40 years previously the Americans dropped the atom bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima) the Soviet Union announced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. This moratorium was extended repeatedly in the hope that the United States would follow our example. It did not. On the contrary, approximately three dozen nuclear devices were exploded in vaults of the Nevada Desert during the time the moratorium was in effect.

October 1986, Reykjavik. Accords of historic importance were achieved here. A world without nuclear weapons appeared not to be a mirage but a close reality which could be entered the next day even, were the two sides to have the desire and responsibility. But the reality did not come to be owing to the notorious SDI, of which the occupant of the White House is literally clinging hold.

True to the spirit of Reykjavik, the Soviet Union considers it a starting point from which in the business of disarmament it is necessary to proceed further, toward the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the nonmilitarization of space. Convincing testimony to the endeavor to implement in practice the principles of the new political thinking is the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons which was signed on 27 November 1986 by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi.

The building of this world, the declaration says, requires specific and immediate measures aimed at disarmament; it may be achieved by way of the conclusion of agreements concerning:

the complete destruction of nuclear arsenals before the end of the current century;

prevention of any weapon being put into space, which is the common property of mankind;

a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing;

a ban on the creation of new types of weapons of mass annihilation;

a ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles thereof;

a reduction in the level of conventional arms and armed forces.

Until nuclear weapons have been eliminated, the Soviet Union and India proposed the conclusion of an international convention banning the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

There are still many difficulties in the way of realization of these proposals, after all, the leaders of the United States and certain other Western countries are unwilling to think and act in policy in the new way and are clinging to the impracticable idea of the achievement of military superiority. True, they speak the good and necessary words from time to time. We would recall in this connection Geneva in November 1985. There the U.S. President agreed that "nuclear war must never be unleashed, it could have no winners." The joint Soviet-American statement emphasized the importance of the prevention of any war--nuclear or conventional--and expressed the aspiration "to prevent an arms race in space and halt it on Earth, limit and reduce nuclear arms and strengthen strategic stability."

Prudent words. It was these words which summoned into being the "spirit of Geneva," a spirit of hope. It seemed that fresh warming breezes were blowing and that our planet would become warmer. However, this did not happen inasmuch as these words remained for the U.S. President just words. He engaged in and continues to engage in deeds, on the other hand, contrary to the interests of peace and the peoples' security. The implementation of unprecedented military programs, the feverish efforts to realize the SDI plans, nuclear testing in a hurry, one exceeding of the limits determined by the SALT II Treaty after another, the deployment of Lance missiles in South Korea, the preparation for war against Nicaragua and the barbaric raid on Libya--such is a far from complete list of these deeds, which are very far removed from the ideals of peace and humanity. Truly militarist insanity has enveloped the transatlantic globalists and claimants to world domination. They are altogether unwilling to abandon the long-failed proposition that it is only possible to talk to the USSR from a position of strength.

The Soviet Union is a powerful, proud and great country which will never forgo its independence and will never permit diktat in respect of itself.

...Prudence and insanity are primordial antipodes of history. It has happened that insanity has gained the ascendancy over prudence. But this has been a temporary triumph of recklessness. Ultimately prudence has triumphed. It has to be thought that it will triumph of this occasion also. Mankind will not allow itself to be exterminated.

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CSO: 1807/346

RELATED ISSUES

TASS REPORTS ADELMAN RESIGNATION, BACKGROUND

LD310444 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1745 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Text] Washington, 30 Jul (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

Kenneth Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, on Wednesday announced his decision to resign. In a letter to President Reagan, he explained that the reason for his decision was that he "had completed his task of helping to draw up a new course in arms control between the United States and the USSR, a course that would reduce armaments and help reduce the threat of war." A White House spokesman reported that Reagan accepted Adelman's resignation and stated that the latter had "done outstanding work in pursuing the administration's policy."

In connection with the frankly self-publicizing character of Adelman's claim, it is being recalled here with unconcealed irony that during his 4 years as director of the agency he worked in "tandem" with Richard Perle, U.S. assistant secretary of defense, who is well-known for his extreme militarist views and who also recently resigned. AP reported that he earned a firm reputation as a supporter of a hard-line policy in relations with the Soviet Union, and indeed whenever he was able he would put spokes in the wheels of arms control negotiations. He was and remains one of the fervent propagandists of the Star Wars program and a U.S. nuclear arms buildup. Not one debate in Congress over issues connected with the administration's military programs would pass without demands from Adelman that billions of dollars be allocated to the programs sought by the Pentagon. He was actively involved in campaigns to defame participants in the U.S. antiwar movement as well as those congressmen striving to achieve a reduction in the heavy expenditures on the arms race and a constructive approach by the administration toward Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva.

Adelman now intends to settle down to this type of activity in the pages of the press, on television, and from the platforms of public organizations and educational establishments, an activity which is, incidentally, being actively undertaken by a man of like mind, R. Perle. In his letter of resignation, Adelman said he will write a biweekly column for nationwide distribution as well as monthly articles for magazines; he will also lecture and work "with one of the think tanks in Washington." It is thought here that this is most likely to be the Washington Center for Strategic and International studies of the extreme right-wing "Heritage Foundation." Both of these centers are engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda as well as drawing up recommendations for the administration, including those in the field of military and foreign policy.

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CSO: 5200/1608

RELATED ISSUES

LONDON, HAGUE, BRUSSELS ANSWER HONECKER APPEAL

PM311353 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 87 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Resolute Steps Needed"]

[Text] Berlin, 28 Jul -- The GDR press has published answers from the heads of government of Belgium, Britain, and The Netherlands to the personal messages sent by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council.

The GDR leader had drawn the attention of W. Martens, M. Thatcher, and R. Lubbers to the unique chance now afforded to achieve a real breakthrough in arms limitation and disarmament. E. Honecker advocated that all states unreservedly approve the "zero option." In the GDR's opinion, the idea of creating a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe acquires new significance in light of Soviet proposals. E. Honecker expressed the firm resolve of the GDR, in conjunction with its allies, to also take purposeful steps toward disarmament in conventional armaments.

In their replies, the prime ministers of the three countries stress the need to examine questions of nuclear disarmament and arms control. They share the hope that an accord will soon be reached on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. However, in setting out their governments' stances on disarmament in conventional arms in Europe and on the question of creating a corridor free of nuclear weapons in central Europe, the prime ministers of the three countries remain faithful to the West's well-known position that the Warsaw Pact states possess a considerable advantage in conventional and chemical armaments in Europe. Thus, according to Mr Lubbers, the creation of such corridors "would not be" in western Europe's security interests. In this situation, Mrs Thatcher's message says, the Western alliance has no alternative but to continue relying on deterrence based on a combination of nuclear and conventional systems.

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CSO: 5200/1608

RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVES ON ASIAN SECURITY ASSESSED

New Initiatives

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 23 Jul 87 pp 1-3

[Article by APN Political Analyst Ryabtsev under the rubric News and Views]

[Text] The Soviet Union is prepared to abolish all its medium-range missiles, including operational-tactical ones, on its Asian territory, in order to promote the "double zero option" concept on a global scale. This was stated by Mikhail Gorbachev when answering questions put to him by the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA in connection with the anniversary of Gorbachev's Vladivostok program for bringing comprehensive security into the Asia-Pacific region (APR).

This step by the Soviet leadership confirms Moscow's serious and responsible approach to the aspirations of the Asian states, which want to strengthen security in their region. For this reason the Soviet Union decided against linking the elimination of its medium-range missiles with American nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, the Philippines and on Diego Garcia Island. At the same time, the Soviet leader expressed the hope that the U.S. would at least not increase its nuclear arsenals in the ARP.

Furthermore, Mikhail Gorbachev put forward a series of new initiatives aimed at easing military confrontation in the region. Among them is the USSR's readiness to assume an obligation not to increase in its Asian territory the number of nuclear-capable aircraft if the U.S. does not deploy their additional nuclear weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory. His proposals also envisage limiting the range of action of ships carrying nuclear weapons and rivalry in anti-submarine activity, and contemplate heavy cuts in the scale of exercises and maneuvers by navies in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Moscow proposed to Washington that it test a "model" of such exercises in the northern Pacific so that the model could later be spread to other areas. At the same time the Soviet leader confirmed the USSR's readiness to help provide international guarantees for safe navigation in the Indian Ocean, its seas, gulfs and bays.

Gorbachev confirmed Moscow's conviction that regional conflicts can be resolved only by political means. He gave a positive assessment of the course of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. In his opinion, there are also reassuring signs for the settlement of the Kampuchean problem on the basis of the policy of national concord and the possibility of creating a coalition of national forces. Having expressed deep concern at the escalation of tensions in the Persian Gulf, he stressed that the Iran-Iraq war is now challenging the ability of the international community to control events which, not without U.S. participation, are going in a highly dangerous direction for the entire world.

It is easy to notice that Moscow persistently strives to implement its Vladivostok program of ensuring lasting and comprehensive security in the APR.

In November last Gorbachev and Gandhi signed the Delhi Declaration on a nuclear-free and non-violent world. The declaration's philosophical and moral basis gives priority to universal values and is aimed at preventing a nuclear catastrophe.

Acting in the mainstream of the new foreign policy approach to the ARP, the Soviet Foreign Minister visited in March of this year Thailand, Australia, Indonesia, Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam. The Kremlin was pleased to note that leaders of these countries advocated the establishment of a durable system of security in the ARP. This was also confirmed by the visit of Thailand's Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila to the USSR. Interest in such security is shown by an intention to set up a zone of peace in South East Asia, free of nuclear weapons, an intention clearly stated at a recent annual conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Singapore.

Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking at a Kremlin reception in honor of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in connection with the opening of a gala festival of Indian culture in the USSR, said that not a single country, not a single group of countries could monopolize the functions of an architect and builder of comprehensive security in the ARP. By doing so Moscow emphasized that in this process each country of the region can play an important and constructive role.

Not surprisingly, the Soviet policy of détente, open to all, has stirred into action the political forces of the region. Plans to visit Moscow have been announced by the Prime Minister of Malaysia and leaders of Indonesia. The reason for such moves in the ARP in respect to the USSR, as Thailand's Foreign Minister recently noted, stems from the new trend in Soviet foreign policy, initiated by Gorbachev.

The answers given by the Soviet leader to the questions of the newspaper MERDEKA are evidence that he is constantly seeking to impart dynamism to the movement for comprehensive security in the ARP. The development of dialogue between the USSR and Asian countries, in turn, indicates a desire of these countries to make their positive contribution to the process. All this conclusively confirms the fact that the Vladivostok program of the Soviet leader meets the vital interests of all countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

(APN, July 22. In full.)

Remarks on PRC Relations

OW310636 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 30 Jul 87

[Danielyants commentary]

[Excerpts] The issue of Soviet-Chinese relations has always been pressing. Just as Gorbachev pointed out in his Vladivostok speech, many of the issues arising in world affairs are dependent upon the relations between these two major socialist powers. I believe that the Chinese people must have correctly understood the historical mission of both the Soviet and Chinese people that was mentioned in this speech.

It might as well be mentioned here that other countries also realize the significance of Soviet-Chinese relations to world affairs. For instance, let us take a look at the recent interview with Gorbachev by the [Indonesian newspaper] MERDEKA. Chief Editor of this newspaper B.M. Diah asked about the status and development of Soviet-Chinese relations. He asked the question at a time when Soviet-Chinese relations play an important role in matters of world security and peace, especially Asian security and peace. Comrade Gorbachev considered the marked progress in trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, cultural exchanges, and political dialogue between the two countries significant in recent development of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Dear Chinese listeners! It has been proved that there are great possibilities and untapped potential for the USSR and China to not only enhance and enrich bilateral cooperation but also to strengthen their ties on the stage of world affairs. This fact would not be questioned if we compare the priorities in the domestic and international policies of the two countries; that is, the two countries have shared the same conviction of displaying the superiority of socialism over capitalism by preserving world peace and preventing nuclear wars on the condition that the two countries coexist peacefully.

Recently, we have been happy to see China become more articulate in regard to the nuclear disarmament issue. The fact that the two major socialist nuclear powers have assumed the commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons has been highly regarded by countries throughout Asia and the world. In answering questions put to him by the MERDEKA reporter, Soviet leader Gorbachev stressed that it is also a major concern of Asia-Pacific nations whether other nuclear powers will assume a similar responsibility.

Shevardnadze Receives Indian Ambassador

LD011524 Moscow TASS in English 1422 GMT 1 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 1 TASS -- Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R., today received the Ambassador of the Republic of India to the U.S.S.R., Triloki Nath Kaul, on his request. During the meeting the sides discussed certain aspects of Soviet-Indian relations and a number of international problems, including those related to the situation in the Asian and Pacific region.

It was noted that the new Soviet peace initiatives set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev in his interview to the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA open broad prospects for ensuring peace and security in that region and the world as a whole.

The meeting proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding.

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CSO: 5200/1608

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA WEEKLY REVIEW: ASIAN SECURITY, NFZ'S, INF, ABM

PM031115 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Aug 87 Second Edition p 4

["International Review" column by Nikolay Kurdyumov]

[Excerpts] A Breath of Fresh Air

The past week has brought new evidence of the broad approval and general support encountered in different parts of the planet by the Soviet Union's bold and constructive policy in the world arena, a policy that sets an example for new political thinking in the struggle to improve the international situation and to ensure all states equal security.

This was confirmed particularly vividly by material carried by the world press devoted to the 1st anniversary of M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, which outlined a comprehensive program for the strengthening of peace and security in Asia and the Pacific by settling regional conflicts, putting an end to confrontations, considerably reducing armies and fleets, introducing trust, establishing friendly relations between states, and freeing the region from the nuclear threat. The statement by Indonesian newspaper SUARA KARYA is typical in this regard. The newspaper notes that the Vladivostok speech "was a breath of fresh air for peace-loving mankind" and "was joyfully welcomed by developing countries."

Indeed, events in the past year constitute graphic proof that despite the complexity of the situation in Asia and the Pacific, the ideas of the Vladivostok peace program, which was developed in the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons, are gradually making headway, bringing about marked shifts in public opinion and an activation of the forces advocating the strengthening of mutual understanding and cooperation in this part of the world.

Despite all the diversity and the contradictoriness of the situation, positive trends in the region are indicated by signs such as the growing desire to be free from nuclear weapons expressed in the Rarotonga Treaty proclaiming the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone; the active discussion by ASEAN countries of the question of creating a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia; the resolute demonstrations in Australia and New Zealand against French nuclear tests in the Pacific; the growing demands that the Korean Peninsula be freed from nuclear weapons; and others.

The fraternal socialist countries are making a considerable contribution to the cause of ensuring security in Asia and the Pacific. For example, the DPRK Government recently put forward a new and far-reaching initiative on the stage-by-stage reduction of DPRK and South Korean Armed Forces to 100,000 men on each side, with subsequent withdrawal of all U.S. troops. Pyongyang immediately backed up this statement with a practical step: An order was issued to demobilize 100,000 soldiers and officers of the Korean People's Army by the end of this year. They will be assigned to the construction of national economic projects.

There also is growing understanding among the region's political and public circles for the Soviet concept of pan-Asian and Pacific security, which is distinguished by a qualitatively new approach toward the settlement of many complex regional problems, constructiveness in the quest for reliable practical measures to create an atmosphere of trust, a solicitous attitude toward other countries' initiatives, and a readiness to seek compromise solutions.

It is, however, impossible not to speak of trends of another sort, of people who stubbornly play the role of champions of militarism and of the transformation of the Asian and Pacific region into an arena of nuclear confrontation. It is indicative, for example, that while the USSR and the PRC have signed the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty containing pledges by the powers to respect the nuclear-free zone's status and not to test nuclear devices there, the other nuclear powers -- the United States, Britain, and France -- have refused to do so. Furthermore, Washington has resorted to a policy of pressure and threats toward states unwilling to tolerate nuclear weapons on their territory or off their shores.

Against this background a striking contrast is presented by the policy of the Land of the Soviets, which is trying with the utmost seriousness and responsibility to accommodate the Asian people's desires, taking their aspirations into account. It is not surprising that the USSR's active position on the question of eliminating the nuclear threat and creating a comprehensive system of international security meets with the sympathy and approval of the peoples. The wide response and tremendous positive reaction in the world with which the new Soviet initiatives put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's answers to questions from the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA were greeted are a graphic illustration of this.

Washington's Position [subhead]

A central place is held among these initiatives by the readiness expressed by the Soviet Union to agree to the elimination of all medium-range missiles, not only in Europe but in the Asian part of the country, too. In other words, we are withdrawing the question of keeping the 100 warheads on medium-range missiles, which are the subject of discussion at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. Provided, of course, that the United States does the same. Operational and tactical missiles also will be eliminated. In short, the Soviet Union is proceeding on the basis of the "global double-zero" concept.

Welcoming this exceptionally important step by the USSR, statesmen and public figures in many countries and the press are united in the opinion that the bold Soviet proposals contain the potential for a breakthrough in the cause of nuclear disarmament and for the achievement of a corresponding agreement at the Geneva talks, and that it is now up to Washington to make a political decision. "Never since the end of World War II," the British newspaper MAIL ON SUNDAY says in an editorial, for instance, "has there been a better opportunity to achieve general nuclear disarmament than now. The Russians sincerely seek real progress at the Geneva talks." THE NEW YORK TIMES admits: "The Soviet leader caught Washington unawares with his statement that the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to the total elimination of medium-range missiles. M. Gorbachev again appeared in the guise of a dynamic leader ready to make important compromises. [paragraph continues]

The Algerian newspaper L'HORIZON, for its part, notes that by putting forward the proposals for the total elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles, the Soviet leader is helping to unblock the Geneva talks and clear the way for a summit meeting.

How is official Washington responding to the USSR's major new initiative, when it would appear that all the imaginary obstacles created at the Geneva talks by the U.S. side should disappear and a real prospect open up for the drawing up of a draft treaty on the total elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range and operational and tactical missiles in the very near future? Unfortunately, as of today the U.S. Administration's position is not notable for a constructive approach and does not inspire optimism. Here is why. According to the White House chief, the United States is prepared to agree to the destruction of missiles and a ban on reequipping these systems as weapons of a different type. As President Reagan has announced, the U.S. delegation in Geneva has been instructed to submit a proposal making provision for a "double-zero" with regard to medium-range and operational and tactical missiles. However, it turns out that the zero-option U.S.-style does not by any means provide for the elimination of all warheads without exception, but is rather like a suitcase with a false bottom, by means of which Washington seeks to keep the 72 nuclear warheads for Pershing-1A missiles in the FRG.

In other words, a new barrier is being erected in the path of an agreement, and, by way of justification, as if to mock common sense, an "argument" has been dreamed up. The U.S. warheads for deployment on West German missiles are, they say, weapons belonging to a "third party," and cannot be the subject of talks. In a word, it has supposedly never occurred to Washington that the warheads should be destroyed along with the delivery vehicles. Since, moreover, the FRG is forbidden, as is well known, to possess nuclear weapons, the untenability of the U.S. position is obvious. Not for nothing is it causing perplexity, to put it mildly, even among U.S. reporters covering the administration's policy. A dialogue that occurred the other day in the course of an official briefing given by White House spokesman M. Fitzwater is notable in this respect.

Question: How can you call this system (the Pershing-1A system) a third country system, if the United States controls the nuclear warheads?

Answer: But West Germany controls the launchers.

Question: Yes, but they cannot launch the missiles without the warheads, so we clearly play a very direct part. Why are you acting as though we were not playing any part in it at all?

Comment, as the saying goes, is superfluous.

The near future at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva will show whether Washington intends to continue to retard their progress by inventing all kinds of pretexts, or whether it intends to work seriously and constructively toward the attainment of an important agreement. Thus far, the U.S. side's approach cannot but cause concern.

Something else also causes concern, namely the haste with which the U.S. capital tried to brush aside the draft agreement submitted by the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms, on certain measures to strengthen the Treaty on Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and to prevent an arms race in space. The Soviet position is based on the premise that preserving the ABM Treaty and strengthening its operation is a necessary prerequisite for the conclusion of an accord on 50-percent reductions in the USSR and U.S. strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States. [paragraph continues]

Although State Department Spokesman C. Redman announced that the U.S. side is "carefully studying" the document and even "impatiently awaiting" a detailed exchange of opinions in Geneva, he then tried to cast aspersions on it, expressing "disappointment" that the Soviet side still seeks to impose limitations on the "strategic defense initiative," which, as is well known, is aimed at the speediest deployment of arms in space, which is categorically prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET COMMENTATORS PRAISE DPRK'S PEACE PROPOSALS

DPRK Proposals

PM301507 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 26 Jul 87 p 3

[A. Zaytsev commentary: "In the Spirit of Good Will"]

[Text] If a world bristling with weapons and divided into opposed armed groups is like a powder keg, then the Korean peninsula is one of its fuses. For 34 years -- since the end of the Korean War -- there has been a situation of "neither war nor peace" there, where large contingents of the armed forces of North and South stand face to face. This in itself explosive situation is intensified by the military presence in South Korea of the United States, which has sited there 48,000 servicemen, military bases, and 1,000 nuclear weapons -- a potential recently expanded by the Pentagon on the pretext of ensuring the security of the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul.

The DPRK Government, which has consistently spoken from a position of peace and which is governed by the desire to ease the situation in the peninsula, has over the years proposed constructive initiatives to Seoul and Washington and has repeatedly taken the first steps toward alleviating tension. Last year, for example, it channeled over 150,000 servicemen into the construction of peaceful civilian installations, and this year it has proposed to hold military-political summit talks with the South with U.S. participation. However, Pyongyang's peace initiatives have remained unanswered.

Continuing its attempts to alleviate tension and hasten the peaceful reunification of Korea, the DPRK has recently proposed a whole package of new constructive proposals.

First, it proposes to mutually reduce the armed forces to 100,000 men in three stages from 1988 through 1991. There would be a simultaneous phased evacuation of the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea until their complete withdrawal and the abolition of military bases and nuclear weapons.

It is envisaged that the reduction and the evacuation will be carried out under broad international control. This task could be entrusted to the commission of neutral countries' representatives, which is now monitoring the North-South armistice agreement and the situation along the military demarcation line dividing them.

These new initiatives thus are a coherent and comprehensively substantiated program of measures for easing tension on the peninsula. To induce Seoul and Washington to implement it, the DPRK Government undertook this year to unilaterally reduce its army by 100,000 men.

The DPRK's constructive proposals lie in the mainstream of all the socialist countries' efforts to consolidate peace and the peoples's security and to remove the threat of a nuclear conflict. They directly echo the Vladivostok program for a comprehensive approach to ensuring security in Asia.

DPRK Initiative on Troops Cuts

PM040931 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[Pavel Senchuk "Commentator's Column": "Answer Required"]

[Text] Probably nothing alienates people from each other so much as the militarization of thinking and the introduction into people's minds of an "enemy image." It is no coincidence that any proposals, if they are really designed to improve the situation and strengthen trust in the planet's hot spots, are inconceivable without real measures to reduce armaments and lessen or completely remove dangerous confrontation.

It is precisely such realistic measures which are envisaged in the statement published recently by the DPRK Government. It met with a broad response and support not only in neighboring countries, including Japan, but also far beyond the region. International commentaries highlight the constructive nature of Pyongyang's proposal for phased movement toward the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula and toward creating military parity between North and South by reducing troop numbers so that by 1992 each side would have armed forces totaling no more than 100,000 men and all U.S. troops and nuclear weapons would be removed from South Korea.

The DPRK Government, displaying goodwill, decided to take the first step toward an accord, namely: to unilaterally reduce its troops by 100,000 men, although according to purely military logic such a step should be expected from the South, where a superior military potential is concentrated. The sincerity of the DPRK's intentions is illustrated by the fact that its new initiative is not an isolated phenomenon but an important link in the chain of consistent efforts by socialist Korea for the good of peace and concord on Korean soil. Surely this is shown by the DPRK's recent call to begin military-political talks with the South and transform the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, its voluntary decision to withdraw 150,000 servicemen from regions adjoining the demilitarized zone for use in the construction of economic projects, the proposal to mutually end military maneuvers, and so on.

What about the South? With Washington's blessing, it is accustomed to call for dialogue from time to time with the emphasis on humanitarian aspects, but for some reason forgetting that it is proposed to implement all this to the accompaniment of the "Team Spirit" large-scale military maneuvers and a further buildup of arms, including U.S. ones. But what sort of useful dialogue, normal contacts between relatives, and mutual understanding, still less unification of Korea, can there be in conditions of the U.S.-South Korean side's downright maniacal commitment to fanning militarist psychosis?

Attempts are made to justify this commitment by citing the "threat from the North." But no such threat exists. What truly exists is the DPRK's new realistic program. Soviet people completely support it. It is time to stop the injections of hatred and put an end to confrontation. The North's constructive proposals demand a similar answer from the other side.

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DIE WELT INTERVIEWS FRG'S VOGEL ON DISARMAMENT

DW311110 Bonn DIE WELT in German 31 Jul 87 p 6

[Interview with SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel by *Die Welt* correspondent Klaus Schwehn; no place or date given]

[Excerpts] *[Die Welt]* Mr Vogel, in the discussion about the Pershing-1A in connection with the current disarmament efforts, the SPD maintains that the missiles have to be eliminated. Does that not mean giving away your bargaining chip?

Vogel: Precisely what we have feared and predicted since the beginning of this year has happened — in the last round, the obsolete, barely functioning 72 Pershing-1A missiles are becoming a serious obstacle to the double-zero option, the Federal Republic is being considered a troublemaker, and the Federal Government is arousing suspicion that it does not want that breakthrough to real disarmament at all. We are giving nothing away. Would we agree if the 72 nuclear warheads were not removed from GDR missiles? I urge the Federal Government — and Mr Genscher supports that position — to give up the role of brakeman. Our security will not be affected at all by eliminating the Pershing-1A missiles. [passage omitted]

[Die Welt] do you believe the Federal Government and the federal defense minister when they say that the missiles might be a bargaining chip for the reduction of Soviet tanks?

Vogel: We have always advocated specific negotiations to remove excessive armament — Soviet weapons in particular. However, to tell the defense committee and the public, first, that the 72 missiles are completely obsolete and would fall apart by 1990 at the latest and subsequently — after discrediting them — to offer them as an object of exchange, to put something over on the Soviets — that is obviously Woerner's logic. If he had intended that, he should have approached it a little bit more intelligently.

[Die Welt] Security policy problems have been the focus of your policy since you were elected SPD chairman. When you talk about NATO's European leg, do you have in mind loosening relations across the Atlantic in favor of tightening relations with Paris?

Vogel: I agree with what Kennedy said in the early sixties that the European pillar of the alliance must be strengthened. And I think that in the long run 320 million people cannot live with the

fact that the world powers are negotiating and deciding the Europeans' fate without the Europeans participating in those negotiations corresponding to their significance.

Further I think that the Europeans cannot leave all their problems and concerns at the Americans' front door forever, but that — in accordance with their strength and economic importance — they should take their affairs in their own hands more than they have. The key to such a development lies in Paris and Bonn. During my visit, I supported even stronger cooperation between Paris and Bonn, including in conventional defense. We respect the exclusive competence and responsibility of the French for their nuclear weapons. As social democrats, we do not want to have anything to do with those nuclear weapons. It was dangerous that Mr Dregger gave the impression recently that the Federal Republic wanted a say in French nuclear weapons.

[Die Welt] Let me ask you again about the French nuclear weapons. What does it mean that German interests could be taken into account more strongly?

Vogel: It means that we take the FRG's renunciation of the possession, disposal, and production of nuclear weapons deadly seriously and that we do not want to have anything to do with them. However, we want the French to advise us about their ideas concerning the function of those weapons, and what that means for central Europe.

[Die Welt] Stronger German-French cooperation -- does that mean joint forward defense [vorverteidigung]?

Vogel: Yes, that is an important point.

[Die Welt] However, you do not consider the German-French antitank helicopter useful, do you?

Vogel: The joint German-French antitank helicopter has been burdened with such high financial risks and technological problems that we say no. By the way, the federal defense minister is well advised to pay more attention to financial limits, even the current federal finance minister has obviously made it clear to him that he cannot expect further financing reaching the billion.

[Die Welt] What about the German-French brigade? If it is activated is it possible that parts of German units would be withdrawn from NATO units?

Vogel: I consider that an interesting proposal. Its main advantage is that it makes quite a few specific problems clearer that have to be studied now. The most interesting question is whether or not Mr Kohl intends to withdraw some of the German units from NATO's infrastructure, or whether he believes that he can induce the French partly to reintegrate in NATO's structure. I do not intend to anticipate the answer to that question. Experts see a lot of variations. However, we in the Federal Republic must realize that all the political forces in France currently reject reintegrating one single soldier in NATO's infrastructure and put him under U.S. supreme command. But we will see. Kohl certainly had something in mind when he made that proposal. [passage omitted]

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW BROADCAST TO CHINA ON SOVIET-PRC COOPERATION

OW041215 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0300 GMT 4 Aug 87

[Mulatov commentary from the "World Today" program]

[Text] We have reported on the consultative meeting held in Beijing last weekend between representatives of the Soviet and Chinese Ministries of Foreign Affairs on the agenda of the forthcoming 42d session of the UN General Assembly, including the disarmament issue. The following is a commentary on this by our station observer Mulatov:

It is a good phenomenon that among the diplomatic activities between the Soviet Union and China, there is a more and more extensive useful exchange of views on impending questions about the life of the two peoples. We, two socialist countries, both realize our responsibilities in today's turbulent world for consolidating the basis for peaceful coexistence and promoting a healthy international situation. The fact that China has recently expressed in an increasingly serious manner its attitude toward the disarmament issue has resulted in greater possibilities for our two socialist countries to expand their mutual understanding and cooperation in the international arena. Moreover, the Soviet and Chinese stands are similar or close to each other on a series of relative urgent issues. On the question of preventing militarization of space, for example, both the Soviet Union and China firmly oppose any plan to expand the arms race to space. Yet the United States, supported by numerous NATO countries and Japan, attaches importance to the militarization of space. In the forthcoming UN General Assembly session, it is imperative to duly appraise the U.S. policy in preparation for Star Wars.

In the struggle for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Asian-Pacific and other regions, cooperation among all peace-loving countries is of increasing urgency. Among the five nuclear powers today, only the Soviet Union and China unconditionally support the specific proposals made by other countries in this regard. The United States and the two other Western nuclear powers refuse to sign the protocol appended to the Treaty on Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific. The U.S. act in opposing the transformation of the Korean peninsula and Southeast Asia into nuclear-free zones cannot but make us alert.

Undoubtedly, the next UN General Assembly session will discuss issues on eliminating the hot spots and conflicting situations in various areas. Even though the Soviet and Chinese views are not identical on every issue in this regard, their stands on many of the issues are close to each other. It was a very good phenomenon that the Soviet-Chinese consultative meeting was held on the agenda of the forthcoming UN General Assembly session, including the disarmament issue. There is great potential for the Soviet Union and China to carry out successful cooperation in the international arena.

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